

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012**

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:33 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Inouye, Leahy, Mikulski, Murray, Cochran, Shelby, Collins, Murkowski, and Coats.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE

Chairman INOUYE. This morning we welcome the Honorable John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, who is providing testimony to our subcommittee for the second time. Beside him, we welcome for the first time General Martin Dempsey, the Army Chief of Staff. Gentlemen, I thank you on behalf of the subcommittee for being here with us today to review the budget request for fiscal year 2012.

The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2012 base budget request is \$144.9 billion, an increase of \$7.2 billion over last year's enacted base budget.

The Army is also requesting \$71.1 billion for overseas contingency operations for fiscal year 2012, which is a decrease of \$30.5 billion from last year's request and reflects the ongoing drawdown of forces from Iraq.

As part of the fiscal year 2012 budget bill, Secretary Gates set a goal for the Department of Defense to achieve overall efficiency savings of \$100 billion over the next 5 years. The Army's share of this initiative is \$29.5 billion, with only \$2.7 billion of those savings programmed in fiscal year 2012, which the Army plans to achieve through aggressive plans to streamline headquarters, reduce overhead, terminate or reduce weapons systems.

The fiscal year 2012 budget request comes at a time when the Army is at a turning point and is examining its post-war role. Your service is being challenged with sustaining an army at war, build-

ing readiness and strategic flexibility required to respond to future conflicts and accelerating the fielding of urgent warfighting capabilities while modernizing for future conflicts.

Unfortunately, the Army does not have a good track record with its modernization efforts. A recent study noted that since 2004 the service has spent between \$3.3 billion and \$3.8 billion each year on programs that we eventually canceled. So I look forward to hearing from you today on some of the Army's modernization plans to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in both today and tomorrow's full operations.

Along with challenges of modernizing the force, manpower issues are just as critical. The Army has been in continuous combat for 10 years, which puts a tremendous burden of stress on soldiers and their families. The Army has made progress in finding ways to mitigate the stress of multiple combat rotations and long family separations.

The current size of the Army allows more time at home before being deployed. However, in a speech earlier this year at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary Gates indicated that it will be increasingly difficult for Army leaders to justify the number, size, and costs of these heavy formations. Today I hope to hear your views on what the future Army force mix should be after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down.

Finally, I look forward to hearing from you both on your assessment of the Army's readiness to respond to unforeseen future military contingencies. We are all aware of potential threats from nations such as China and North Korea and Iran, but there are many more unknown flashpoints around the globe that the United States could be called upon to engage. With the Army continuing to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, efficiency initiatives and potentially large defense cuts to help reduce the national debt and difficult manpower decisions, I would like to get a better understanding of your concerns regarding the Army's readiness to respond to other contingencies around the world.

And so, gentlemen, we sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and the dedication and sacrifices made daily by men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country each and every day. So I look forward to working with you to ensure that the fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill reflects the current and future needs of the U.S. Army.

We have received your full statements, and I can assure you that they will be made part of the record.

Now may I call upon the vice chairman, Senator Cochran?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses before the subcommittee this morning. We are here to review the budget request for the next fiscal year.

The request proposes a number of significant changes and important budgetary issues for us to consider, but we look forward to working with you during the appropriations process as we review

the budget request of the Department of the Army for this next fiscal year.

We appreciate your service and we welcome you to the committee.

Chairman INOUE. May I call upon Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing Secretary McHugh and General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, I just want to echo your remarks and that of the ranking member in thanking both Secretary McHugh and General Dempsey for all that they do to keep our country safe and to keep our troops safe. And I look forward to hearing their testimony in these frugal times, how we keep our commitment to the military in the same way that they keep their commitment to us.

So thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, I could not say it better than the four of you said it. I would just add a big ditto to all of that so we can get to the hearing.

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished vice chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the subcommittee.

As always, it is a pleasure to be back here in the halls of Congress where I had the honor of serving for some 17 years, but especially appreciate, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, my second opportunity to appear before this distinguished body and to discuss the status today as well as the future of the world's greatest force for freedom, the United States Army.

But before I begin, with your indulgence, I would like to recognize—not introduce because I know you all know him—but to recognize and express my appreciation to the Senate as a whole for acting very expeditiously on a nomination that I think President Obama made very wisely of General Marty Dempsey as our new Chief of Staff, 37th Chief of Staff of the Army. And his is a career that spans some four decades, and at every level at which he has served, our new chief has made incredible contributions. And I can say very safely, having observed him and now approximately a month into the job, he has already begun to lead and shape our force for the future challenges that we may face. Simply put, he is an exceptional leader. He is a scholar and I do believe a friend. I and, indeed, the entire Army family are truly excited he is on board.

With that, I want to thank each of you on this critically important subcommittee for your steadfast support of our 1.1 million soldiers, 279,000 civilian employees, and as always, their families who also serve. With the leadership and assistance of the United States Congress and particularly all of you, America's Army continues to be at the forefront of combat, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security assistance operations in nearly 80 countries around the world.

In Iraq, our soldiers and civilians began one of the largest and most complex logistical operations in our Nation's history. As we continue to draw down our forces to meet the December 31, 2011 deadline, we have already closed or transferred over 86 percent of the bases that we formerly occupied to Iraqi authorities. We have reduced the number of United States personnel by over 75,000 and redeployed more than 2.3 million pieces of equipment. And having just visited in Iraq in January, I can tell you firsthand the enormity of that retrograde operation and the exceptionally high morale of our remaining forces as they continue to advise and assist and train Iraqis to support what we all recognize is still a burgeoning democracy.

Simultaneously, with drawdown operations in Iraq, your army has surged an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the al Qaeda network and the Taliban insurgency. And this surge has enabled our soldiers and our Afghan partners to seize multiple sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent heartland of southern Afghanistan.

Additionally, during this past year, our forces have trained 109,000 Afghan National Army soldiers, as well as 41,000 Afghan National Police. And 2 weeks ago, I visited those great soldiers and their leaders in Afghanistan, and although operating, as you know, in an extraordinarily austere and dangerous environment against a determined enemy, our soldiers, your Army, alongside our Afghan and NATO partners are defeating those Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists. Each day they are taking back enemy strongholds, while simultaneously protecting and providing for the Afghan people.

Although we have seen extraordinary success in recent days, including a heroic raid against a key al Qaeda leader, we should make no mistake. The stakes in Afghanistan are high. Our forces remain vigilant and committed to defeating our enemies, supporting our allies, and protecting our Nation's security.

And overseas contingency operations are only one part of our Army's diverse requirements. Our soldiers and our civilians, all our Army components are committed to protecting our homeland not only from the threat of enemies who would harm us, but also from the ravages of natural and manmade disasters. From National Guard soldiers assisting with drug enforcement and border security to the Army Corps of Engineers, as we have seen in recent days responding to the catastrophic floods along the Mississippi, America's Army has been there to support local, State, and Federal partners in saving, protecting, and caring for our citizens.

As the Army continues to fight global terrorists and regional insurgents, we must be ever mindful of the future and the enemies it may bring: hybrid threats, hostile state actors, to name just two. It is vital, therefore, that we have a modernization program, one that provides our soldiers with the full array of equipment necessary to maintain a decisive advantage over the enemies we are fighting today, as well as deter and defeat tomorrow's threats at a price that we can afford.

Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is critical to achieving this goal by supporting the extraordinary strides being made in the

Army's state-of-the-art network tactical wheeled vehicle and combat vehicle modernization programs.

Regarding the network, this budget requests \$974 million in procurement and \$298 million in research and development for the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, WIN-T, which will become the cornerstone of our battlefield communications system.

The budget also contains \$2.1 billion in procurement for the joint and combat communications systems, including the joint tactical radio system, or JTRS.

As we look to modernize our vehicle fleets, we are asking for \$1.5 billion for tactical wheeled vehicle modernization and over \$1 billion to support vital research and development for combat vehicle modernization, including \$884 million for the ground combat vehicle and \$156 million for the modernization of Stryker, Bradley, and Abrams platforms.

Along with advances in equipment, the Army is seeking new methods to use and secure our scarce energy resources. Clearly, future operations will depend on our ability to reduce our dependency, increase our efficiency, and use more renewable or alternative sources of energy. We have made great strides in this area. The Army has established a senior energy council, appointed a senior energy executive, and adopted a comprehensive strategy for energy security. Based on this strategy, we are developing more efficient generators and power distribution platforms. Factoring in fuel costs is part of our equipment modernizations, and we have instituted a net zero pilot program to holistically address our installations' energy, water, and waste needs.

Moreover, we are changing how we do business by undertaking comprehensive emphasis to reform our procurement methods. In 2010, General Casey and I commissioned an unprecedented blue ribbon review of the Army acquisition systems and did it from cradle to grave. We are currently analyzing the panel's insightful report and we will use it as a guide over the next 2 years to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the Army acquisition process.

But we did not stop there. To ensure that we purchased the right equipment to meet the soldiers' needs, we instituted a series of capability portfolio reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and terminate those programs that are redundant, do not work, or which are just too expensive. These broad-based reviews have already helped us to identify key gaps and wasteful redundancies while promoting good stewardship of our Nation's resources.

I assure you we remain committed to using every effort to obtain the right system, supplies, and services at the right time in the most cost-effective, streamlined manner possible. Our soldiers and the taxpayers deserve no less. We look forward to working closely with this committee as we continue to implement these sweeping changes.

Throughout it all, at its heart, our Army is people. Although our soldiers and civilians are better trained, led, and equipped and more capable than ever before, our forces are clearly stretched and our personnel are strained from a decade of war. This is evidenced by yet another year of discouraging rates of suicide and high-risk

behavior not only among the regular Army, but the reserve components as well.

In response, under the direct supervision of our Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, the Army completed an unprecedented 15-month study to better understand suicide and related actions amongst our soldiers. In July, we published the first-ever health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention report, a very frank and candid assessment designed to assist our leaders in recognizing and reducing high-risk behavior, as well as the stigma associated with behavioral healthcare. The lessons from this holistic review have been infused into every level of command and incorporated throughout our efforts to strengthen the resiliency of our soldiers, families, and civilians.

Moreover, our fiscal year 2012 budget request provides \$1.7 billion to fund vital soldier and family programs to provide a full range of essential services to include the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention; and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.

Caring for our personnel and their families, however, goes beyond mental, physical, and emotional health. We are committed to protecting their safety both at home and abroad from the internal and external threats. As part of our continuing efforts to learn and adapt from the Fort Hood shooting, the Army has instituted a number of key programs to enhance awareness, reporting, prevention, and response to such threats. For example, we have implemented Eye Watch and I Salute programs to improve our ability to detect and mitigate high-risk behavior indicative of an insider threat.

To enhance interoperability with local, regional, Federal agencies, Army installations will also fully implement the National Incident Management System by 2014. We will field the FBI's eGuardian system and require all installations to have emergency management equipment such as e-911 and mass warning notification systems.

Let me close by mentioning my deep appreciation and admiration for all those who wear the Army uniform, as well as the great civilians and families who support them. Daily I am reminded that these heroes make enormous sacrifices for the defense of this Nation, sacrifices that simply cannot be measured.

Moreover, I know that each of you plays a key role in the success of our Army. Your efforts and support ensure that our soldiers, civilians, and Army families receive the critical resources and authorities they need, and we cannot do it without you.

PREPARED STATEMENT

So thank you. I deeply appreciate this opportunity to be before you, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, America's Army has been challenged and prevailed in some of the most daunting tasks in the history of our military. Soldiers from the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve demonstrate indelible spirit, sacrifice and sheer determination in protecting our national interests and supporting our friends and allies around the world.

In the coming years, our top priorities will be to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force for other missions and build resilience in our people. The Army has made significant progress in restoring balance through the four imperatives we identified in 2007—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. We are on track to achieve a sustainable deployment tempo for our forces and restore balance to the Army beginning in fiscal year 2012. We successfully completed combat operations in Iraq, transitioning from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn while executing one of the largest wartime retrogrades in the Nation's history. Operation New Dawn marks the beginning of a new mission for our Army while demonstrating our ongoing commitment to the government and people of Iraq. Concurrently, we surged Soldiers to Afghanistan in support of a new strategic direction in this vital theater. Even with all we have done, there is still much work to do.

The war is not over yet, and we remain in an era of persistent conflict facing an uncertain and increasingly complex strategic environment. Hybrid threats made up of conventional, irregular, criminal and terrorist capabilities will continue to test our forces. These threats will avoid our strengths and attack us asymmetrically. Therefore, we must continue to organize our formations, update our doctrine and prepare our forces for the full spectrum of operations.

Additionally we remain aware of the difficult economic conditions at home. These conditions will drive our efforts to transform our generating force into an innovative and adaptive organization. We must adapt our institutions to effectively generate trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations, while seeking ways to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures that demonstrate wise stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars. With the continued support of the American people and Congress, we remain committed to the readiness and well being of our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. As the Strength of the Nation, the American Soldier is the centerpiece of everything we do.

WHERE WE HAVE BEEN

For nearly a decade, the Army has been operating at an exhausting pace. High operational demands have stressed our ability to supply trained and ready forces during most of this period. The result was an Army out of balance, lacking strategic flexibility to respond to other contingencies and lacking the ability to sustain the all-volunteer force. This past year the Army continued to make great strides toward restoring balance to the force.

The drawdown in Iraq and change of mission from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010 represented a significant accomplishment made possible by the extraordinary determination, hard work and sacrifice of American Soldiers, their Families and the Civilian workforce. During Operation New Dawn, the remaining 50,000 U.S. service members serving in Iraq will conduct stability operations focused on advising, assisting and training Iraqi Security Forces, all while engineering the responsible drawdown of combat forces in one of the largest and most complex logistical operations in history. The Army closed or transferred over 80 percent of the bases to Iraqi authorities, reduced the number of U.S. personnel by over 75,000 and redeployed more than 26,000 vehicles.

Concurrently, we implemented the President's direction to surge an additional 30,000 Soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This surge enabled our Soldiers and our Afghan partners to take back insurgent sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. Additionally, during this past year our forces have trained 109,000 Afghan National Army Soldiers, as well as 41,000 Afghan National Police. As a result, we are beginning to see an improvement in Afghan National Security Force capability.

Last year, the Army responded to three major natural and environmental disasters while continuing to support homeland defense. The Army provided humanitarian relief in response to the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the summer floods in Pakistan and the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Additionally, our National Guard Soldiers were sent to the Nation's southern border to help control

increased illegal activity. They assisted Federal law enforcement agencies responsible for drug enforcement and the security of our borders.

During this past year the Army continued to increase its knowledge and understanding of Full Spectrum Operations. Last October, the Army conducted the first full spectrum rotation against a hybrid threat at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. This was the first time in 5 years that we have been able to conduct a training rotation focused on anything other than operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we continue to build dwell and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units will conduct full spectrum training rotations at the Combat Training Centers increasing our ability to hedge against the unexpected and restoring strategic flexibility to the force.

Though we remain heavily engaged, the Army is regaining balance. We are starting to be able to breathe again. We must continue efforts to fully restore balance while maintaining the momentum we have achieved over the past 4 years. The strategic environment continues to be complex, and the stakes are too high to become complacent or underprepared.

RESTORING BALANCING

Through the continued support of Congress and the American people, we will lessen the stress on America's Army by focusing on the imperatives we established 4 years ago. We must continue to sustain the Army's Soldiers, Families and Civilians; prepare forces for success in the current conflicts; reset returning units; and transform the Army to meet the demands of the second decade of the 21st century.

SUSTAIN

Our first imperative is to sustain our all-volunteer force. We must reduce the stress on Soldiers, Families and Civilians who have borne the hardship of 9½ years of conflict. In addition to addressing this high level of stress, the Army invests time, energy and resources into quality of life programs. We must continue to inculcate resilience in the force, providing Soldiers, Families and Civilians the skill sets necessary to deal with adversity.

Goals

The most important component required to restore balance within our Army is to increase the time between deployments, known as dwell time. A study completed in 2009 confirmed what we already intuitively knew: Soldiers require at least 2 to 3 years to fully recover, both mentally and physically, from the rigors of a 1 year combat deployment. Training and schooling necessary for a professional Soldier to sustain warrior and leader skills are also very important. With these critical considerations, our interim objective is to achieve and then maintain a dwell time of at least 2 years at home for every year deployed for the active component Soldier and 4 years at home for every year mobilized for the reserve component Soldier. In 2011 we will examine the cost and benefits of increasing dwell to 1:3 and 1:5 respectively with a 9 month Boots on the Ground policy.

In addition to increasing dwell time, the Army must continue to recruit and retain quality Soldiers and Civilians from diverse backgrounds. People are our most important resource, and to sustain an all-volunteer force it is essential to attract those with an aptitude for learning and then retain them as they develop the tactical, technical and leadership skills the Army needs. To grow and develop the Army's future leadership, we need appropriate incentives to encourage sufficient numbers of high quality personnel to continue to serve beyond their initial term of service.

Another important consideration is the health of the force. We must provide our Soldiers and Civilians, as well as their Families, the best possible care, support and services by establishing a cohesive holistic Army-wide strategy to synchronize and integrate programs, processes and governance. There are myriad programs available to accomplish this, such as Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant and other community covenants. Our focus is on improving access to and predictability of services. We will enhance support for the wounded, Families of the Fallen, victims of sexual assault and those with mental health issues. Our effort to build an entire spectrum of wellness—physical, emotional, social, family and spiritual—will support achieving Army strategic outcomes of readiness, recruitment and retention. The Army is also building resilience in the force by addressing the cumulative effects of 9½ years of war. We have designed a comprehensive approach that puts mental fitness on the same level as physical fitness by establishing a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, developing Master Resiliency Trainers and implementing a campaign for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction. The Army has a requisite duty to provide world class healthcare for our wounded, ill or injured Warriors

and to successfully transition these Soldiers and their Families back to the Army or civilian life. This is coordinated through the Warrior Care and Transition Program and ably led by well resourced Warrior Transition Units. Our final and most solemn responsibility is to respect and honor the sacrifice of our fallen comrades by continuing to support the needs of their Families.

Progress

Achieved 101 percent of recruiting goals for 2010, exceeding both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits. Over 98 percent of recruits had high school diplomas, the highest percentage since 1992.

Exceeded reenlistment goals: 114 percent for the active component and 106 percent for the reserve component.

Decreased accidents and mishaps in several key categories, to include: Off-duty fatalities down by 20 percent; on-duty critical accidents down by 13 percent; Army combat vehicle accidents down by 37 percent; and manned aircraft accidents down by 16 percent.

Expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

Graduated more than 3,000 Soldiers and Civilians from the Master Resilience Trainer course.

Surpassed 1 million Soldiers, Civilians and Family members who have completed the Army's Global Assessment Tool to begin their personal assessment and resilience training.

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Highlights for Sustain

Provides \$1.7 billion to fund vital Soldier and Family programs to provide a full range of essential services to include the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention; and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. In addition, this funding supports Family services including welfare and recreation, youth services and child care, Survivor Outreach Services and education and employment opportunities for Family members.

Provides Soldiers with a 1.6 percent military basic pay raise, a 3.4 percent basic allowance for subsistence increase and a 3.1 percent basic allowance for housing increase.

Continues to fund the Residential Communities Initiatives program which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for Soldiers and their Families living on-post and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-post.

PREPARE

Properly preparing our Soldiers for combat against a ruthless and dedicated enemy is critical to mission success. To do so, we must provide the appropriate equipment and training to each Soldier and ensure units are appropriately manned. Our generating force must continuously adapt—tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, manning and equipping—to ensure units have the tools necessary to succeed in any conflict. At the same time, we are aggressively pursuing efficiency initiatives designed to reduce duplication, overhead and excess as well as to instill a culture of savings and restraint.

Goals

The Army identified four key goals necessary to adequately prepare the force for today's strategic environment. The first was to responsibly grow the Army. The congressionally approved growth of the Army was completed ahead of schedule in 2009. However, after a decade of persistent conflict, a number of other factors—non-deployable Soldiers, temporary requirements in various headquarters and transition teams, our wounded Warriors, elimination of stop-loss—has impacted our ability to adequately man units for deployment. As a result, the Secretary of Defense approved an additional temporary end strength of 22,000 Soldiers, 7,000 of whom were integrated in 2010. The Army will return to the congressionally approved active component end strength of 547,400 by the end of fiscal year 2013. The second key goal addressed training. The Army will continue its commitment to leader, individual and collective training in order to remain mentally, physically and emotionally agile against a highly decentralized and adaptive foe. The third key goal is to provide the Army with effective equipment in a timely and efficient manner. We must implement a new materiel management approach to ensure a timely avail-

ability of equipment that not only protects our Soldiers and maintains our technological edge, but does so prudently.

The final and most critical goal is to fully embrace our rotational readiness model—a process we call Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN will allow a steady, predictable flow of trained and ready forces to meet the Nation's needs across the full spectrum of conflict. Drawing from both active and reserve components, the ARFORGEN process allows us to consistently generate one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 20 brigade combat teams, and 90,000 enabler Soldiers (i.e., combat support and combat service support). When the current demand comes down, it will allow us to build and maintain the ability to surge one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, 10 brigade combat teams and 40,000 enabler Soldiers as a hedge against contingencies. ARFORGEN also allows a predictable and sustainable dwell time for Soldiers. We are currently working to better align the generating force activities and business processes that support ARFORGEN.

Progress

Trained and deployed seven division headquarters, 16 brigade combat teams, four combat aviation brigades, and eight multi-functional/functional brigades for deployments to Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2010.

Increased Army inventory of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to 20,000 vehicles.

Deployed more than 4,300 Army Civilians to Iraq and Afghanistan to support operations in both theaters.

Discontinued the Stop Loss program; last Soldiers affected by the policy will leave active duty in early 2011.

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Highlights for Prepare

Supports a permanent, all volunteer force end strength of 547,400 for the active component, 358,200 for the National Guard and 205,000 for the Army Reserve in the base budget. Provides for a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component in the Overseas Contingency Operations request (14,600 end strength on September 30, 2012).

Includes \$2.1 billion in procurement for Joint and Combat Communications Systems, including the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and an additional \$1.5 billion in Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization funding.

Provides over \$5.6 billion for the Army to implement training strategies in support of Full Spectrum Operations, designed to prepare units for any mission along the spectrum of conflict, i.e., to perform the fundamental aspects of offense, defense, and stability operations against hybrid threats in contemporary operational environments.

Invests \$1.5 billion in 71 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters—a critical step in modernizing the utility helicopter fleet. Provides a digitized cockpit, new engine for improved lift and range, and wide-chord rotor blades.

Devotes \$1.4 billion to procure 32 new and 15 remanufactured CH-47F Chinook Helicopters with a new airframe, Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), digital cockpit and a digital advanced flight control system, as well as an additional \$1.04 billion to modernize the AH-64 Apache.

RESET

In order to ensure a quality force and a level of readiness necessary for the complex range of future missions, we must continue to reset our units' Soldiers, Families and equipment. This is especially critical given the tempo of deployments. It is a process that must continue for two to three years after the end of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Goals

In order to achieve our reset goals, we continue every effort to revitalize Soldiers and Families by allowing them an opportunity to reestablish, nurture and strengthen personal relationships immediately following a deployment. This includes a review of our procedures for demobilization of reserve component Soldiers. We strive to make this post-deployment period as predictable and stable as possible. The Army also seeks to repair, replace and recapitalize equipment. As we continue the responsible drawdown in Iraq while simultaneously building up capability to complete our mission in Afghanistan, it is critical that we efficiently replace all equipment that has been destroyed, and that we repair or recapitalize equipment impacted by extreme environmental conditions or combat operations. We will achieve this by adapting the production and manufacturing processes in our arsenals and

depots, sustaining existing efficiencies, improving collaboration and eliminating redundancies in materiel management and distribution. This will save the Army money in equipment costs and lessen the strain on the supply lines into and out of combat theaters. We finished the reset pilot program which was designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the reset process, and we will continue to apply lessons learned. As we drawdown in Iraq and eventually in Afghanistan, we will continue to focus on retraining Soldiers, units and leaders in order to effectively reset the force. Too often over the last 9½ years, the Army had to prioritize deployment over certain education and training opportunities for Soldiers. Given the uncertain strategic environment we face in the future, it is critical that the Army focus on education and leader development as well as provide Soldiers, units and leaders training for full spectrum operations.

Progress

Sponsored over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families with over 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participating.

Completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of equipment, and continued the reset of 13 more.

Distributed 1.3 million pieces of equipment, closed or transferred 418 bases, drew down 16 Supply Support Activities and redeployed over 76,000 U.S. military, civilian and coalition personnel—all in support of the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq.

Deployed Army aircraft with Condition Based Maintenance plus (CBM+) technologies into combat theaters. CBM+ is a proactive maintenance capability that uses sensor-based health indications to predict failure in advance of the event providing the ability to take appropriate preventive measures. A cost-benefit analysis for CBM+ indicated that it has a Benefit-to-Investment Ratio of 1.2:1 given a 10 year operations period.

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Highlights for Reset

Provides \$4.4 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

Continues to support training and sustainment of Army forces including individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

TRANSFORM

In order to provide combatant commanders with tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the spectrum of conflict in an uncertain threat environment, the Army continues to transform our operating force by building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments. We continue to convert brigades to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular organizations while rebalancing our skills to better prepare for the future. This process not only positions us to win today's conflicts, but it also sets the conditions for future success.

To support the operating force, our generating force must become a force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must transform the business systems of our generating force by developing a fully integrated management system, improving the ARFORGEN process, adopting an enterprise approach and reforming the requirements and resource processes that synchronize materiel distribution, training and staffing. Transformation of the generating force is key to our ability to effectively manage, generate and sustain a balanced Army for the 21st century.

Goals

Our plan identifies five goals necessary for effective transformation. The first is completing our modular reorganization. Our plan calls for converting all Army brigades from cold war formations to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations. Our reorganized units have proven themselves extremely powerful and effective on today's battlefields. The second goal involves accelerated fielding of proven, advanced technologies as part of our modernization of the force. The Army will develop and field versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure our Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they confront. In the Information Age, the Army must be networked at all times to enable collaboration with Joint, combined, coalition and other mission partners to ensure our Soldiers have a decisive advantage. Third, we must institutionalize the investment in our reserve component and obtain assured and predictable access to them, so that the Army can achieve the strategic flexibility and operational depth required to re-

spond to emerging contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. We are systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for reserve component Soldiers, Families, employers and communities through the ARFORGEN process. We must modify Army policies and update congressional authorizations in order to fully realize the potential of an operationalized reserve component and capitalize on their significant combat experience. The fourth goal is the re-stationing of forces and Families around the world based on the Base Realignment and Closure statute. The Army is in the final year of this complex and detailed 5 year effort that has created improved work and training facilities for our Soldiers and Civilians as well as new or improved housing, medical and child care facilities for our Families. The last aspect of transformation is Soldier and leader development, which is an important factor in maintaining the profession of arms. Today's Army has a tremendous amount of combat experience that must be augmented with continued professional education and broadening opportunities in order to develop agile and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are able to operate effectively in Joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental and multi-national environments.

Progress

Reached 98 percent completion of the modular conversion of the Army. The fiscal year 2012 budget will support completion of this process.

Restored nearly a brigade combat team's worth of equipment and its entire sustainment package in the Army Pre-Positioned Stocks program for the first time since 2002, greatly enhancing the Army's strategic flexibility.

Provided identity management capabilities for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. Government and international partners through the DOD Automated Biometric Identification System. The nearly 1.3 million biometric entries enabled latent identification of approximately 700 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events, 1,200 IED-related watch list hits, and 775 high-value individual captures in 2010.

Issued Soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division the Soldier Plate Carrier System—a lightweight vest that provides ballistic protection equal to the Improved Outer Tactical Vest in a standalone capacity while reducing the Soldier's load, enhancing comfort and optimizing mobility.

Fielded 20 million Enhanced Performance Rounds, providing our Soldiers with leap-ahead performance over the previous 5.56 mm round. The Enhanced Performance Round provides excellent performance against soft targets, has an exposed penetrator that is larger and sharper to penetrate hard targets and is more effective at extended ranges. The round is also lead-free.

Educated over 300 General Officers and Senior Civilian Leaders in business transformation concepts and management practices through the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program.

Disposed of over 24,000 acres and closed three active installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in fiscal year 2011.

Supported DOD in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRN) Consequence Management support required for a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident by transforming the CBRN Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) to a new response force within the CBRN Consequence Management Enterprise. The CBRN Consequence Management Enterprise consists of a Defense CBRN Response Force, two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements, 10 Homeland Response Forces, 17 CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages, and 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Highlights for Transform

Provides \$974 million in procurement and \$298 million in continued Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) which will become the cornerstone tactical communications system by providing a single integrating framework for the Army's battlefield networks.

Provides \$1.04 billion in support of the Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy including \$884 million for the Ground Combat Vehicle and \$156 million for the modernization of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams combat vehicles.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

As America enters the second decade of the 21st century, the Army faces a broad array of challenges. First and foremost, we must succeed in Afghanistan and Iraq and continue to combat violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We must also prepare for future national security challenges that range across the spectrum of conflict. All of this must be accomplished within the context of challenging global economic conditions.

Global Trends

Global trends will continue to shape the international environment. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their collective impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts that will confront the United States and our allies.

Globalization has spread prosperity around the globe and will continue to reduce barriers to trade, finance and economic growth. However, it will also continue to exacerbate tensions between the wealthy and the poor. Almost 85 percent of the world's wealth is held by 10 percent of the population while only 1 percent of the global wealth is shared by the bottom 50 percent of the world's population. This disparity can create populations that are vulnerable to radicalization.

Globalization is made possible through significant technological advances that benefit people around the world. Unfortunately, the same technology that facilitates an interconnected world is also used by extremist groups to proliferate their ideology and foment terrorism. Additionally, there are an increasing number of foreign government-sponsored cyber programs, politically motivated individuals, non-state actors and criminals who are capable of initiating potentially debilitating attacks on the electronic infrastructure of our Nation and allies.

Population growth in the developing world creates new markets, but the accompanying youth bulge can create a population of unemployed, disenfranchised individuals susceptible to extremist teachings that threaten stability and security. Furthermore, the bulk of the population growth is expected to occur in urban areas. Future military operations are more likely to occur in densely populated urban terrain—among the people rather than around them.

The demand for resources such as water, energy and food will increase competition and the propensity for conflict. Even as countries develop more efficient uses of natural resources, some countries, particularly those with burgeoning middle classes, will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources.

Proliferation and failing states continue to be the two trends of greatest concern. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for destabilizing catastrophic attacks. Meanwhile, failed or failing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export terror. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups already seek weapons of mass destruction and will use them against Western interests given the opportunity.

Persistent Conflict

Persistent conflict has characterized the environment in which the Army has operated over the last 9½ years. This protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors, using violence to further their ideological and political goals, will likely continue well into the second decade of the 21st century. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope and will be less susceptible to traditional means of conflict resolution. Concurrently, the Army's Soldiers and Civilians will respond to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies in support of civil authorities both at home and abroad. The Nation will continue to rely upon the Army to be ready to conduct a wide range of operations from humanitarian and civil support to counterinsurgency to general war.

Violent extremism in various forms will continue to constitute the most likely and immediate threat around the world. A more dangerous threat will come from emergent hybrid adversaries who combine the agility and flexibility of being an irregular and decentralized enemy with the power and technology of a nation state. These security challenges, in whatever form they are manifested, constitute the threat that the Army and our Nation will face for the foreseeable future. Our Army must remain alert to changes in this volatile environment and build the agility to anticipate and respond to change by maintaining our combat edge.

THE NEXT DECADE

The Nation continues to be faced with persistent and ruthless foes that maintain a clear intent to attack us on our soil. Entering the future under these conditions, the Army remains a resilient but stretched force—one that has performed superbly while simultaneously transforming in the midst of a war. The high demand we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely recede over the next few years, but other demands will surely arise. Our Soldiers and Civilians will have more time at home, and that will necessitate a different type of leadership at our garrisons between deployments. Given this future, the Army's challenge in the second decade of the cen-

ture is to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force, and build resilience for the long haul.

Maintaining Our Combat Edge

Beginning in 2012 we anticipate having about as many BCTs available that are not earmarked for Iraq and Afghanistan as we will have of those deploying. It will be imperative that we remain focused on tough, demanding training at home station and at our training centers to ensure that our Soldiers and units sustain their combat edge. This training must be accomplished at an appropriate tempo and while meeting the unique challenges associated with increased time at home. Those units who are not deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan will undergo full spectrum training and be available to combatant commanders for security cooperation engagements, exercises and other regional requirements as well as fulfilling our requirements for a Global Response Force and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. To do this, the Army will need to revitalize home station and leader development programs. We must continue to challenge our young, combat-seasoned leaders who will lead our Army into the second decade of this century and beyond.

Another aspect of maintaining our combat edge involves codifying our experience and lessons learned. Institutionally, we must refine our doctrine and warfighting concepts. While our understanding of Full Spectrum Operations has matured, we must continue to clarify how we define and how we conduct Full Spectrum Operations across the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to general war. As units have more time at home, we will train against the wider range of threats and in a broader range of environments. We will use these experiences to drive the continued adaptation of the Army.

Reconstituting the Force

The Army must reconstitute the force, ensuring excellence in core competencies while building new capabilities to support an uncertain and complex future operating environment. Reconstitution requires not only completely resetting redeploying units, but also continuous adaptation of our forces as we move forward in a period of continuous and fundamental change. While the Army has almost finished transforming to modular formations and balancing the force, we continue to integrate the lessons learned from 9½ years at war with our expectations of the future. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commenced an in-depth study of our force mix and force design to ensure that we have the right capabilities in the right numbers in the right organizations for the future. We are committed to continually transforming our force to retain the flexibility and versatility it will need for the uncertain future environment.

Another area that will require continual adaption is our mix of active and reserve component forces. The Nation has been at a state of national emergency for 9½ years. As a result, the Army has had continuous access to the reserve component through partial mobilization. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have performed magnificently, and the relationship between components is better than it has ever been. Our Soldiers have fought together and bled together, and more than ever, we are one Army—a Total Force. Our Nation cannot lose the enormous gains we have made.

Transforming the reserve component into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost effective use of the entire force. To that end, the Army recently completed a study of what the future role of our reserve component should be in an era of persistent conflict in which continuous deployment is the norm. The steady, consistent and recurring demand for reserve capabilities during this decade has posed significant challenges for a force organized and resourced as a strategic reserve. In response, the Army recast its reserve forces from the part-time strategic reserve role to a fully integrated and critical part of an operational, expeditionary Army. We are seeking changes to achieve affordable, predictable and assured access to the reserve component for the full range of assignments in the homeland and abroad. One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army; we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the Nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-manned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.

The other significant element of reconstitution—modernization—is designed to give our Soldiers a decisive advantage in every fight. The goal of our modernization strategy is to develop a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations that operate on a rotational cycle. This enables us to routinely provide combatant commanders trained and ready forces to operate across the spectrum of conflict. This involves developing and fielding new capabilities while modernizing and recapital-

izing old capabilities. Our top two modernization initiatives will be to develop, test and field the network and to field a new Ground Combat Vehicle in 7 years. Throughout this process, our industrial base will continue to identify and adopt improved business practices and maximize efficiencies to repair, overhaul, produce and manufacture in support of modernization and recapitalization efforts.

Building Resilience

As we look toward the next decade, we must also build resilience in our people. The last 9½ years have taken a physical, mental and emotional toll on our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. No one has been immune to the impacts of war. This decade of experience, combined with the reality that our Nation is in a protracted struggle, underscores how important it is that we take advantage of our time at home to strengthen our force for the challenges ahead, even as we continue to deal with the continuing impacts of war. Although off-duty, high risk behavior is a continuing challenge, we have made significant progress in the last 10 years in reducing accidental fatalities. This highlights the resilience of our force as our Soldiers find healthier ways to handle the stresses of Army life. In addition to the Army Safety Program, last year the Army began two efforts designed to strengthen our Soldiers, Families and Civilians for the challenges ahead: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness and the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention. We will institutionalize the best of both of these programs into the force over the next year.

The Network

The last 9½ years of war have demonstrated that the network is essential to a 21st century, expeditionary Army. Networked organizations provide an awareness and understanding required by leaders who must act decisively at all points along the spectrum of conflict, and by Soldiers on the ground who are executing the mission. The network is also essential for planning and operating with Joint, coalition and interagency partners. The network, therefore, is the Army's number one modernization effort.

The Army's portion of the Department of Defense network, LandWarNet, must be able to provide Soldiers, Civilians and mission partners the information they need, when they need it and in any environment—from the garrison to the tactical edge. To do so, it must be a completely integrated and interoperable network, from the highest to the lowest echelon, forming a true enterprise network. The Army is pursuing critical initiatives to build this enterprise capability, including an enterprise e-mail, calendar-sharing and ID management service (through a partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency), data center consolidation and Active Directory consolidation. These initiatives will increase warfighting effectiveness, improve network security, save hundreds of millions of dollars over the next 5 years and reduce infrastructure. Additionally, the Army is transforming business systems information technology to better support our business operations and strategic leader decisionmaking.

The Army is also changing the way it supplies network systems and capabilities to operational units by using an incremental approach to modernization. By aligning the delivery of new technology with the ARFORGEN process as it becomes available, we ensure the integration of network capability across our combat formations. This "capability set" approach will field enhanced performance in a more timely and efficient manner.

Ground Combat Vehicle

To operate in austere conditions against a lethal, adaptive enemy, our Soldiers need a fighting vehicle that is capable of full spectrum operations with better levels of protection than our current vehicles. To meet that need, the Army is focused on developing a versatile ground combat vehicle that will meet an array of anticipated future requirements and see its first delivery in 7 years. It will provide the needed protection against a variety of threats, including that of improvised explosive devices, and deliver Soldiers to the fight under armor. Even with the significant capabilities that a new Ground Combat Vehicle will provide, it comprises only one element of the Army's overall combat vehicle modernization strategy. Our strategy also addresses improvements to vehicles like the Paladin howitzer and Stryker combat vehicles, integration of the MRAP into our formations and prudent divestment of obsolete systems.

STRATEGIC CROSSROADS

Our Nation and its Army are positioned at a unique point in history. This is not quite like any other year. We must now consider the hard-won lessons of recent

combat experience, current and anticipated resource constraints and the uncertainty of the future. The decisions we make will have far reaching and long lasting implications. This calls for deliberate and thoughtful choices and actions as we determine where to best invest our Nation's precious resources.

Transforming the Generating Force

Over the course of the past decade, the operational Army has evolved dramatically. The need for change was driven by a fundamental reality: daily contact with a decentralized, adaptive, creative and deadly enemy. The Army's generating force, which prepares, trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwide, is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by both the current and future operating environments. It has performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while seeking to adapt institutional business processes.

Furthermore, the Army is working to provide "readiness at best value" in order to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and international economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's institutional management processes and develop an Integrated Management System, while continuing to meet combatant commander requirements, has never been more urgent. Thus, to enhance organizational adaptive capacity, while wisely stewarding our resources, the Army initiated a number of efforts along three primary business transformation objectives: establish an enterprise mindset and approach; adapt institutional processes to align with ARFORGEN; and reform the requirements and resource process.

To enable business transformation and foster an enterprise approach, we established the Office of Business Transformation and developed enterprise functions that are facilitated by teams of leaders who focus on the domains of Human Capital, Readiness, Materiel and Services and Infrastructure. At the most strategic level, we established the Army Enterprise Board to provide a forum for Army senior leaders to address organizational strategic choices and tradeoffs. Additionally, we established our Business Systems Information Technology Executive Steering Group to facilitate an enterprise approach to information technology investments.

We are working collaboratively to reform our requirements and resourcing process in order to create an organizationally aligned set of capabilities. As part of that effort, we have initiated an Army Acquisition Review. This review will provide a blueprint for actions over the next 2 years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army acquisition processes. We've also commissioned a short-term task force to analyze costs, establish credible benchmarks and help us better understand not only where our investment dollars go, but also what we get in return. We are developing a systematic approach to the Army's business processes that will ensure that innovative ideas and efficiencies influence future budgets.

Furthermore, we instituted a portfolio review process that is bringing discipline to our acquisition programs by evaluating and realigning requirements with the reality of today and what we will need in years to come. This Capability Portfolio Review process is providing an overarching detailed analysis and set of recommendations to revalidate, modify or terminate each of our requirements, including research and development, procurement and sustainment accounts. These reviews are helping us identify gaps and unnecessary redundancies, while ensuring good stewardship of our Nation's resources. We are building a foundation that will identify savings, manage strategic risks, maximize flexibility and posture us even more effectively for the future.

Civilian Workforce Transformation

There are approximately 279,000 Civilians in the Army. Adding the Army Corps of Engineers and personnel supported by non-appropriated funds, the number exceeds 335,000 Civilians. That is about 23 percent of our total Army force. Army Civilians live and work in communities throughout our 50 States and U.S. territories and overseas theaters of operation. They comprise 60 percent of our generating force.

This generating force performs many of the essential tasks that support ARFORGEN so our Soldiers can concentrate on their missions. Army Civilians have deployed and stood in support of our Soldiers during the most dangerous and difficult periods of conflict. In fact, over 4,300 Civilians deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in 2010. The Nation's ability to sustain the all-volunteer force will be difficult and challenged if we do not prioritize development and investment in our most important institutional asset, our people. Now, as never before, we increasingly call upon our Civilian Corps to assume greater levels of responsibility and accountability at organizations throughout the Army, and we must invest in them accordingly. The goal is to become a generating force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and

to field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. Therefore, the Army has embarked upon a Civilian Workforce Transformation initiative to pursue five lines of effort.

First, we will integrate requirements determination, allocation and resourcing processes that identify the civilian workforce capabilities. Second, we will improve civilian workforce lifecycle strategy, planning and operations to enhance mission effectiveness. Third, we will establish an integrated management system to support civilian human capital decisionmaking. Fourth, we will deliberately develop Army civilian leaders. Fifth, we will reform the civilian hiring process. By the end of 2011, the Army will implement a comprehensive competency-based Civilian Leadership Development Program and fully implement the Civilian Talent Management Program. These programs will ensure that employees and management understand what is required for success, with realistic career paths and developmental opportunities to achieve success.

The pay-off for this program is four-fold. For Civilians, the transformation will provide an outline for success with the appropriate training and development opportunities to facilitate the achievement of their career goals within the Army. For Commanders, the Civilian Workforce Transformation will provide the right workforce with the right training and development for the current and future mission requirements. For the Army, it will provide a predictable and rational method to articulate requirements and make decisions about resourcing in a fluid environment. Finally, for the Nation, the transformation will provide the investment in human capital required to effectively manage the institutional Army now and in the future.

STEWARDSHIP, INNOVATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Fiscal Stewardship

We take our responsibility to serve as good stewards of the financial resources the Nation has entrusted to our care very seriously, and we are taking action to improve our ability to manage those resources effectively.

To help our leaders and managers make better resource-informed decisions, we have placed renewed emphasis on cost management throughout the Army. At all levels, from installation to Army Headquarters, we have implemented training and professional development programs to give our people improved cost management skills and a greater understanding of the cost implications of their decisions. Training programs include a graduate-level Cost Management Certificate Course for carefully selected mid-level analysts, professional development courses for general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service, training incorporated into existing courses throughout the Army's formal schooling system and hands-on training in cost-benefit analysis. These programs have reached over 2,700 Soldiers and Civilians, and training continues.

In addition to providing training and professional development, we must give our people the essential tools that will enable them to carry out their cost management responsibilities. Toward this end, we have fielded the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) to more than 11,000 users at 14 major installations. As reported by the Government Accountability Office, GFEBS development is on schedule and on budget. Much more than an accounting system, GFEBS is the Army's new business system. It gives managers a greatly improved capability to manage the cost, schedule and performance of their programs and, at the same time, is the centerpiece in our progress toward full auditability of our financial statements

Energy Security and Sustainability

Energy security and sustainability are operationally necessary, financially prudent and are key considerations for Army installations, weapon systems and contingency operations. Energy security means that the Army retains access to energy and can continue to operate when catastrophe strikes and energy supplies are disrupted, cut off or just plain difficult to secure. To remain operationally relevant and viable, the Army must reduce its dependency on energy, increase energy efficiency, and implement renewable and alternate sources of energy.

The Army has established a Senior Energy Council, appointed a Senior Energy Executive, created an Energy Security Office, and adopted a comprehensive energy security strategy. This strategy will not only lead to energy cost savings but help create a more sustainable force with increased endurance, resilience, and force protection. We will enhance our stewardship of our Nation's energy resources and less dependent upon foreign sources of fuel. The Army's logistical tail of the operational energy pipeline is a handicap that must be overcome through technological ad-

vances. We must leverage technology to improve our agility and flexibility against an irregular and decentralized enemy.

On Army installations, we are developing a holistic approach, called Net Zero, to address energy, water, and waste. Net Zero is a force multiplier enabling the Army to appropriately steward available resources, manage costs and provide our Soldiers, Families and Civilians with a sustainable future. In an era of persistent conflict, with a mission of stabilizing war-torn nations, a true stabilizing factor can be that of appropriate resource management. The Net Zero plan ensures that sustainable practices will be instilled and managed throughout the appropriate levels of the Army, while also maximizing operational capability, resource availability and well-being.

We have taken a significant step by incorporating all fuel costs throughout the lifecycle of the equipment as we analyze various alternatives for modernization programs such as the next ground combat vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. This approach enables us to make informed decisions about various alternatives and define energy efficiency performance parameters in capability documents for our program managers and original equipment manufacturers. Of course, not all solutions will involve big pieces of equipment or new vehicles. We are also pursuing technologies on a much smaller scale, such as spray foam tent insulation and shower water recycle systems—investments from which direct energy savings pay off in a matter of months.

We are also working on more efficient generators and power distribution. Development of hardware, software and controls to perform micro-grid implementation is underway for buildings at the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This technology also has potential for use in a deployed operational environment. The Army is preparing to field “smart grid” capabilities for tactical command posts and forward operating base camps that will enable generators to support the larger grid instead of a single end user. As they become scalable and deployable, renewable energy technologies can also be integrated into these smart grids.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The last 9½ years of conflict have had significant impacts on the Army, its Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Many of these are well documented and are being addressed. There remain, however, other consequences that we seek to understand. We will examine the impacts of war on our profession of arms and take a hard look at ourselves—how have we changed as individuals, as professionals and as a profession.

The Army is more than a job; it is a profession. It is a vocation composed of experts in the ethical application of land combat power serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. The level of responsibility is like no other profession—our Soldiers are entrusted to apply lethal force ethically and only when necessary. Also, unlike other professions, the profession of arms is practiced in the chaotic and deadly machinations of war. Along with that awesome responsibility comes both individual and organizational accountability, which we seek to examine as parts of our Profession of Arms.

The American Professional Soldier is an expert and a volunteer, certified in the Profession of Arms and bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the Nation and Constitution. The Soldier adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the profession. Contrasting this are state, non-state and individual actors who operate outside generally accepted moral and ethical boundaries. Because of this, the Army has received tremendous support from the American people and their elected representatives. We are forever grateful for that support, and we do not take it for granted. We understand that this generous support is predicated on the Army’s continued professionalism, guided by our Army creeds, our service oaths and the Army values that anchor our conduct (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage).

In order to examine the impacts of our current experience on the Profession of Arms, the Army will continue a discussion at all levels in which we will ask ourselves three fundamental questions:

- What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms?
- What does it mean to be a Professional Soldier?
- After 9 years of war, how are we as individual professionals and as a profession meeting these aspirations?

The dialogue will help inform our understanding on what it means to be a professional Soldier in an era of persistent conflict.

CONCLUSION

The professionalism, dedicated service and sacrifice of our all-volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army—the Strength of our Nation. Soldiers, their Families and Army Civilians continue to faithfully serve our country as we prevail in one of the most challenging times in our Nation’s history.

The Army is achieving its goals to restore balance in fiscal year 2011. We will be transitioning to a period where we must reconstitute the force for other missions; build resilience in our Soldiers, Families and Civilians and diligently maintain our combat edge. We are modernizing the force for the future by developing and fielding versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they might face.

We are responding to the lessons our operating force learned and the changes it made over the past 9½ years by adapting the institutional Army to effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations. The sector of the Army that trains and equips our Soldiers, the generating force, must be driven by innovation and be able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must continue to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures as good stewards of our Nation’s valuable resources. We recognize that institutional change is not only about saving money, and efficiencies are not simply about improving the bottom line. Institutional change is about doing things better, doing them smarter and taking full advantage of the progress, technology, knowledge and experience that we have available to us.

With the trust and confidence of the American public and the support of Congress with appropriate resources, America’s Army will remain the Strength of the Nation.

2011 RESERVE COMPONENT ADDENDUM TO THE ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102–484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 521 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2010.

Section 517(b)(2)(A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	Fiscal year 2009			Fiscal year 2010		
	AC in RC	Percent ¹	Army average percent ²	AC in RC	Percent ¹	Army average percent ²
Major	56 of 63	88.9	94.1	57 of 67	85.1	92.1
Lieutenant Colonel	16 of 20	80.0	87.9	10 of 12	83.3	88.7

¹ Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	Fiscal year 2009			Fiscal year 2010		
	AC in RC	Percent ¹	Army average percent ²	AC in RC	Percent ¹	Army average percent ²
Major	2 of 4	50.0	6.0	6 of 123	4.9	5.7
Lieutenant Colonel	0 of 1	7.2	0 of 7	10.7

¹ Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 21,725 or 51.5 percent of which 1,998 were fiscal year 2010 accessions.

Army Reserve officers: 21,378 or 58.8 percent of which 589 were fiscal year 2010 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted—101,896 or 31.9 percent of which 8,281 were fiscal year 2010 accessions.

Army Reserve enlisted—63,670 or 37.5 percent of which 5,592 were fiscal year 2010 accessions.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In fiscal year 2010, there were two Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2010, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to the Army National Guard.

In fiscal year 2010, under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted two waivers to the Army Reserve. The waivers afforded Soldiers the opportunity to play a professional sport and complete their service obligation.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In fiscal year 2010, there are no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In fiscal year 2010, there were 20 ROTC graduates released early from an active-duty obligation. The following is a breakdown of the ROTC graduates that are completing the remainder of their service obligation in a Reserve Component.

ARNG: 1

USAR: 19

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

There are no longer active and reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.

In fiscal year 2010, the ARNG recommended 1,913 ARNG officers (Title 10; Title 32; ADSW; AD; M-Day) for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 1,913. The number consists of 265 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,595 Army Promotion List and 53 Chaplains. Of the 1,913 promoted officers, 1,053 were M-Day Soldiers consisting of 175 U.S. Army Medical Department, 844 Army Promotion List and 34 Chaplains.

In fiscal year 2010, the Army Reserve recommended 63 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 63.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In fiscal year 2010, 1,607 ARNG Noncommissioned Officers received a promotion to the next rank without the required military education (based on a waiver agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 648 completed their military education requirements. The majority of waivers were deployment related.

In fiscal year 2010, 486 Army Reserve Noncommissioned Officers received a military education waiver (based on a waiver agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 257 waivers received approval based on deployment and/or operational mission requirements.

Waiver consideration is case-by-case. The criteria for waiver consideration are: (1) eligible for promotion consideration, (2) recommended by their State (for ARNG), (3) disadvantaged as a direct result of operational deployment conflict, and (4) no available training quota. This includes Soldiers deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU) (Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) with a medical condition. Some waiver requests did not meet the criteria.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In fiscal year 2010, the ARNG had 47,804 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In fiscal year 2010, the Army Reserve had 48,229 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2010 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army National Guard is 131 officers and 265 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. States and territories. NGB maintains the breakdown by each State. The numbers represent improvement driven by the Recruit Force Pool (RFP) and by miscellaneous administrative actions. The RFP initiative changed the way ARNG accounts for Soldiers. ARNG does not count Soldiers until the accession process is complete and they have an assigned position. Administrative improvements included an aggressive effort to eliminate Negative End Strength (defined as Soldiers who have been on the NOVAL Pay list for 3 months or more, have expired ETS dates, in a Non-MOSQ status

for 21 months or more, or in the Training Pipeline with no class reservation). These improvements helped the ARNG meet the End Strength Ceiling of 358,200 by the end of fiscal year 2010 by moving those Soldiers into the Inactive National Guard (ING).

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2010 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army Reserve is 30 officers and 62 enlisted Soldiers. Under AR 135–175, Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for Officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning. Under AR 135–178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In fiscal year 2010, there were no waivers granted by the Secretary of the Army for the U.S. Army Reserve or the Army National Guard.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In fiscal year 2010, 163,457 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 7,936 or 4.8 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In fiscal year 2010, 162,749 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 15,025 or 9.2 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In fiscal year 2010, the ARNG identified 7,936 or 4.8 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

In fiscal year 2010, the Army Reserve identified 15,025 or 9.2 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

On August 23, 2010, the Department of Defense implemented a change to how the Army measures Individual Medical Readiness (IMR). The new way of measuring medical readiness by classifying Soldiers into Medical Readiness Categories (MRC) reduced the number of Soldiers considered medically non-deployable (MND) in the reserve component. This information is available through the Army's medical readiness database, MEDPROS.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Division A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Division A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Division A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Division A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense reserve component unit mobilizations are now limited to 400-day periods, including post-mobilization training time, a 30-day post-mobilization leave and 5 days out-processing. Timely alert for mobilization—at least 1 year prior to mobilization—is crucial. Many training tasks previously conducted during post-mobilization occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for reserve component conventional forces conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units to deploy. A unit’s post-mobilization training time depends on how many of the pre-mobilization tasks they complete in pre-mobilization. Whatever pre-mobilization tasks they do not complete during pre-mobilization training, they will complete the remaining tasks at the mobilization station.

First Army Pre-Deployment Training in support of Combatant Commanders’ guidance identifies four categories of deploying units. CAT 1 includes units that rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB). CAT 2 includes units that will or potentially will travel off a COB/FOB for a short duration. CAT 3 includes units that will travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB. CAT 4 is maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as BCTs). The pre-mobilization tasks per category increase up to CAT 4. A CAT 4 unit spends between 58–60 training days at mobilization station for post-mobilization training. The target is 45 training days. A CAT 4 unit is required to perform a Combat Training Center (NTC or JRTC) culminating training event (30 days) during post-mobilization in order to meet validation requirements and deploy.

Army goals for post-mobilization training for reserve component headquarters and combat support, and combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type/category of the unit, and does not include administrative and travel days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of counterinsurgency operations; counter-improvised-explosive-device training; convoy live-fire exercises; theater orientation; rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training; and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period. Below is an outline of typical post-mobilization periods for various units:

Unit structure	Post-MOB TNG days	
	Legacy	Current
Military Police Battalion (I/R)	90	53
Engineer Company (Construction)	90	58
Medium Truck Company	90	49
Transportation Detachment	90	37
Infantry Battalion	174	71
Expeditionary Sustainment Command	168	37

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During fiscal year 2010, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT’s) the ARNG continued to use the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer and Abrams Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provide full crew-simulations training for M1A1 and M2A2 units. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2 units and cross leveling of the Conduct of Fire

Trainer XXI for M1A1 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer-Situational Awareness (COFT-SA) and Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT with geo-specific databases provides commanders with unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received this capability, providing a mobile training capability available to all Soldiers throughout the ARNG.

To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is completed. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The Army Reserve has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units.

The reserve components supplement their marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The ARNG also continues to field IEDES kits. The configuration of IEDES kits are set to simulate Small, Medium, Large, and Extra Large Explosive signatures. The IEDES kits provide realistic battlefield cues and the effects of Explosive Hazards to Soldiers in both a dismounted and mounted operational status.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC). The BCTCP consists of three BCTCs at Camp Dodge, Iowa; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a regional Distributed Mission Support Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2010 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The BCTCP synchronizes ARNG battle command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre-mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool Defined as Certified Company Proficiency with demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The States do not capture this data.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During fiscal year 2010, Army National Guard Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted inspections of the Army National Guard. The total number of ARNG units that were inspected were 1,193, plus an additional 26 United States Property and Fiscal Offices (USPFOs), totaling 1,219 inspections. Regular Army Officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the inspections. The Department of the Army Inspector General, 1st U.S. Army, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and various external inspection agencies conducted the remaining 128 inspections. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections did not receive a pass/fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.

During fiscal year 2010, the Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in the areas of Rear Detachment Operations (RDO) and Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PHDRA). Commissioned officers of the Army Reserve inspected 81 units. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these assessments did not receive a pass/fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

There are no longer formal ground combat active or reserve component associations due to ongoing theater operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

First Army, as FORSCOM's executive agent, and the 196th Infantry Brigade, as U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent, executes the legislated active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve component units. When reserve component units mobilize, they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct oversight of First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army

National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

	Title XI (fiscal year 2010) authorizations				Title XI (fiscal year 2010) assigned			
	OFF	ENL	WO	Total	OFF	ENL	WO	Total
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215	21	117	1	139
TRADOC	50	3	53	106	36	3	39	39
FORSCOM	979	2,165	101	3,245	671	2,296	83	3,050
USARPAC	30	49	1	80	31	54	1	86
Total	1,156	2,327	110	3,593	759	2,470	85	3,314

As of September 30, 2010, the Army had 3,314 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. Army G-1, and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The states do not capture this data.

Chairman INOUE. Now may I call upon the new Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Dempsey. General.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHIEF OF STAFF

General DEMPSEY. Thank you very much, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our Army with you this morning.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for the vote of confidence.

Since I assumed the duties as the 37th Chief of Staff of the Army, I have worked to get a feel for where we are and help inform my thoughts about where we need to go in the future.

One of the very first things I did was go to Iraq and Afghanistan to visit our troops to see firsthand their accomplishments and to thank them for their courage, their sacrifice, and their service. I visited soldiers and families back here in the continental United States as well, and this weekend, I will visit our Corps of Engineers who are working tirelessly to combat the historic flood levels along the Mississippi River valley. And then I will travel to Fort Carson, Colorado to hand out some awards at our Wounded Warrior Games.

What we are able to do as an Army at home and abroad for soldiers, families, and for our wounded is a testament to the sustained support of this subcommittee. We have our challenges, but where it matters most on the ground around the world, American soldiers, Active, Guard, and Reserve, are getting it done and achieving the Nation's objectives in ways that should inspire all Americans.

To ensure we continue to provide what the Nation needs from its Army, I have begun to articulate where I intend to focus my energy as Chief of Staff, and I would like to share just a few thoughts about that this morning.

We recognize our responsibility to prevail in the wars that we are fighting, prepare for the challenges of an uncertain future, prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, our allies, and partners, and preserve the all-volunteer force as those tasks are laid out for us in our national security strategy and in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

To do that, we must maintain an appropriate end strength, a versatile force structure, and an array of capabilities. We must train and equip our forces to overmatch any adversary and we must meet our obligations to soldiers, families, and wounded warriors who have sacrificed much over the last 10 years of sustained conflict.

We also recognize that we must not only be good stewards of the resources you have provided, but look for smarter and better ways to provide the Nation the capabilities that we need. We must find the right balance between end strength and operational tempo. To preserve our options, we are considering, for example, how best to reduce the 27,000 temporary end strength increase we received 2 years ago and the 27,000 permanent end strength reduction plan between now and 2015.

All of us have come to realize the impacts of end strength and demand on the Army's operational tempo, and we are always assessing our force generation models and what you know as our BOG/dwell ratio, boots on the ground/time at home. We are currently examining whether we can transition to a 9-month deployment with a 27-month dwell at home as our objective for the active component. We assess that this would alleviate some of the pressures on the force while still meeting the demands of the combatant commanders and fulfilling our obligations to the Nation.

Our obligations to the soldiers, families, and Army civilians, Active, Guard, and Reserve who comprise this great Army are simple. Give them what they need to win, provide them and their families with support and services that recognize their sacrifice.

The Secretary discussed several of our modernization programs. With his support, I have also initiated an analysis of the squad as our fundamental fighting element. As an Army, no one can challenge us at corps level, division level, brigade level, or battalion level. I want to ensure we have done as much as possible to make sure that that same degree of overmatch exists at the squad level. Simply stated, we have decided to take a look at our Army from the bottom up and see what we learn.

This does not mean we are going to stack even more gear on the individual soldier who is already strained by the load they have to carry in combat. What it means is that we will look at the squad as a collective whole, not nine individual soldiers, and determine how to enable it from the bottom up to ensure that the squad as the training, leadership, doctrine, power and energy, protection and lethality to win when we send them into harm's way.

I assure all of you that this Nation has never had a better organized, a better trained, or a better equipped Army. Of course, that is in large measure because we have never been better resourced, and for that our Army owes you a great debt of gratitude. As our resourcing changes, we will adapt as we have many other times in our history, but we will be adapting from a position of great strength. And I could not be prouder of what our soldiers have done and will continue to do to support our Nation's interests around the world.

I look forward to working with Secretary McHugh and the members of this subcommittee to make our Army smarter, better and more capable with the resources we are given. We remain an Army at war and we will be for the foreseeable future. We will do whatever it takes to achieve our objectives in the current fights and we will provide the Nation with the greatest number of options for an uncertain future.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your questions.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, General Dempsey.

TEMPORARY END STRENGTH

As noted by both of you, the Secretary of Defense has indicated a plan to reduce our active Army forces by 27,000 by fiscal year 2016 or 2015. First, I would like to know whether you consider this a reasonable plan, and second, how do you propose to do it?

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, as I know you and the other members of the subcommittee understand, we have spent a lot of time with the Secretary and the people at OSD to make sure that the way forward on this makes sense, that we are not buying an unreasonable amount of risk.

The two phases I think need to be considered very separately. The temporary end strength, the 22,000, was something that we always assumed would be coming down in the near term rather than the far term. We were concerned that we not have to begin that process immediately. We felt, at the time that discussions were ongoing, that indeed the OPSTEMPO was such that those 22,000 continue to serve a purpose, and the Secretary, I think it is fair to say, understood and agreed with that and has allowed us to hold that 22,000 until March of next year when we think, particularly given the ongoing drawdown in Iraq, that we can take that reduction in force structure in stride and, in fact, do it in a way that produces both savings and a responsible force at the end of it.

As the Secretary has also said with respect to the second tranche, due to begin in 2015 and 2016, on the 27,000, that that is conditions-based. And based upon what the President has spoken about and our NATO allies with respect to beginning drawdowns of some yet-to-be-determined number this summer based on General Petraeus' recommendations—I assume that will be received by the White House in the near future—you can start to look for a path forward. Beyond that, as our NATO partners have agreed, they expect to have major operations begin to cease in 2014 in Afghanistan and if conditions on the ground allow that to continue, we feel very comfortable that the 27,000 is a very achievable target as well.

FUTURE DRAWDOWN

I think the question for us, frankly, is how do we shape that drawdown and what is the ramp in which we assume it. So we are looking through our total Army analysis that we do routinely with respect to how the Army looks as to where the numbers should come from, how the ramp should be structured in a way that can go forward reasonably in way that does not place our soldiers at greater risk.

Chairman INOUE. General Dempsey.

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I would simply add, Senator, that I think it is a reasonable plan. Like any plan, it is based on some assumptions, and if those assumptions play out, then the plan will be prudent. If the assumptions are changed in any way, then we would have to come back and readdress them.

But as I mentioned to you earlier, we also want to look not just at this immediate challenge, but we want to look beyond and determine what does the Nation need of its Army notionally in 2020 and make sure that these changes are building toward that Army so that we do not end up making these adjustments on an annual basis.

ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary and General, the United States Army has been rather unsuccessful in fielding major acquisition

programs in recent years. Significant terminations include future combat system, the armed reconnaissance helicopter, the Comanche, and many, many more. Last summer, you commissioned a study to identify the causes of these failures which have cost the taxpayers about \$100 billion.

Would you tell the committee what you discovered and how you plan to improve Army acquisition?

Mr. MCHUGH. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will start and then certainly would defer to the Chief for anything he would like to add.

As you noted, we viewed that study as long overdue. This really was something that General Casey had been thinking about for some time before actually I came to the building. And I was pleased that we were able to work together and bring a cadre of top-notch people to take an outside look. It was headed by a former commander of the Army, Materiel Command, and a former Army acquisition executive, ASAALT, and the team that they put together was really a blue ribbon panel of folks who had both been involved, most of them over a career in acquisition and who probably understood it better than we did.

They came back with 76 recommendations, some of which were revelatory. I had a meeting, in fact, this week with our acquisition people, including the ASAALT, to talk about those recommendations to see where we are in implementing them. It was, indeed, that report that pointed out the failures of the various platforms that you mentioned and the significant costs to the taxpayer.

And I think the number one thing—and it was obvious on its face, but how we respond to it is another matter—was our inclination in the past to not control requirements. And we have seen that in a number of programs, and FCS I think is the poster child for it, as is the presidential helicopter where requirements keep getting built on and built on. The time of the acquisition stretches out, and pretty soon the cost has skyrocketed and you have an underperforming program to state the least.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

So we tried to do a better job in stating the requirements, keeping them less reliant on immature or unavailable technologies. We have introduced competition, for example, through the ground combat vehicle program so that we can have that cost containment influence there.

And I think the ground combat vehicle is a very good example of how we are doing better. When the request for proposal (RFP) for the ground combat vehicle went out, there were 990 tier 1 requirements. That was at the outset before we had actually seen a spiral of increased requirements. To the Corps' credit on the acquisition side of the equation, they looked at it and said to themselves, here we go again. And it was a tough decision, but they recalled that RFP. And as a result of the reexamination, they reduced the tier 1 requirements by 75 percent and put the rest of the requirements up into tier 2 and tier 3 where you can trade, as the development goes forward, for costs. So a tough decision, but one, at the end of the day, I think was very soundly supported by the industry and will serve not just the Army, but the taxpayers more fairly as well.

So we want to do a better job. We are implementing the study's reports, and in fact, we have either implemented or are taking steps right now to implement all but 13 of the 76 recommendations. We are taking a more careful look at 13 of those. So we are going to do a better job, and it is not just a matter of the Army's responsibility to the Army. It is a matter of our responsibility to the taxpayer.

Chairman INOUE. General.

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, sir.

You know, we actually have done well on ACAT II and III programs and on some rapid adaptation and rapid equipment fielding initiatives. So the real challenge for us is to figure out why did we do so well in some of these rapid acquisition procedures and not so well in the very deliberate DOD 5000 series of acquisitions.

PROCUREMENT PROCESS

And I think we will learn that we have got some work to do merging the requirements with the procurement objectives. I think we will probably find ourselves in a position of believing that we should pull the future toward us and not have aspirations to deliver programs much beyond 7, 8, 9 years. When they stretch beyond that, they become, by the definition of the word, "incredible," and we are lacking credibility.

So I think it is a combination of the Decker-Wagner recommendations. I think we have to look at the acquisition regulations particularly for the long lead time procurement programs and we got to merge requirements in procurement and senior leadership integration much sooner in the process.

Chairman INOUE. We will have to continue on discussions on this.

But now may I call upon Senator Cochran.

HELICOPTER REPLACEMENT

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it is disturbing to review the difficulties faced, not of their own making, but the current leadership of the Army is confronted with replacing helicopters and doing something about aging tanks. And so it seems like a lot of things are piling up at once that cost an awful lot of money.

I listened carefully to your responses to Senator Inouye's question, and I am not exactly sure what you said. In terms of what is the plan for replacing reconnaissance helicopters, has the Army agreed on what it wants or what it needs? Is there a contract in place now that will replace the helicopters? And the same thing for the tank.

Mr. MCHUGH. We do have an ongoing need for an armed reconnaissance helicopter, and we do have a plan by which we are going to approach that challenge. We are not, as yet, in an acquisition program. We have what we call a CASUP, which is what the cockpit upgrade program, in the near term for the Kiowa Warrior that I think with high reliability we will extend the viability of that platform probably till 2023, and in the interim, we have to begin to look at the analysis of alternatives and develop an RFP for a follow-on to the Kiowa Warrior. So when the Comanche was cancelled, it did not end the enduring requirement. So we have a plan,

but we do not have answers yet as to what exactly the next platform will look like, but we have laid a process forward.

As to the tank, actually the Abrams platform is amongst the most modern of any system in our Army. The average year of the M1A2 Abrams is about 2 years, but the ground combat vehicle is our critical development program to really provide the survivability of an MRAP with the maneuverability of a Stryker and the lethality of a Bradley. So as you know, Senator, this budget requests \$884 million for that program. So we think the GCB is on track.

We do have, as you noted, a lot of platforms out there that are aging out, and what we are trying to do is align ourselves in a responsible manner so we can use the dollars that we have for the follow-on developments wisely. In most of those cases, we have a way forward that we would be glad to talk to you about in greater detail at your convenience.

Senator COCHRAN. General.

General DEMPSEY. No, I have nothing further to add. I have nothing to add to the Secretary's response.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. Secretary, in the area of Army ballistic missile defense, I want to ask if you could comment on two programs in particular: Patriot and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, or IBCS. Could you describe just for the subcommittee the importance of those programs to the warfighter, and how are those programs performing budget- and schedule-wise?

Mr. MCHUGH. It would be hard to, from the Army perspective, overstate the importance of those programs.

Senator SHELBY. Would you say they are of the utmost importance?

Mr. MCHUGH. I think that is a fair description, Senator. The PAC-3 is our protection system against ballistic, air-breathing threats. We are very, very comfortable with the capabilities that it provides. All of our launchers now in the Army have PAC-3 capability. So we think that program has been incredibly important, and in the near term, I do not see that changing.

Senator SHELBY. It has recently come to our attention that the Army is considering perhaps transferring its missile defense budget and program responsibilities to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). I am concerned that Patriot and IBCS which, as you have said, are critical to our warfighters in performing well, could be used as bill payers for programs that MDA considers a higher priority. Could you explain to the subcommittee the status and the details of this proposal, where it is, and how can you assure that the budget for Patriot and IBCS will be protected if MDA controls the funding?

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, if that were to go forward—and we do think there are some efficiencies and some logic behind that, in fact, occurring. But if that were to go forward, there would be Army representation within that organization at the highest level. And as I just said to you, the Army would be very, very ill-disposed against

using Patriot PAC-3 as a bill payer, and we would have to fight that battle as we go forward. But at this moment, I do not have any indication that that would be the case.

SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

Senator SHELBY. General Dempsey, in the area of the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) which conducts space and missile defense operations for the Army, as you well know, and in support of the U.S. Strategic Command, as we look into the future, how would you think SMDC's mission will evolve and grow? Will it continue to be a vital part of the Army and contributor to STRATCOM? And finally, is the SMDC budget request adequate to fulfill the mission that you envision for the command?

General DEMPSEY. I will begin at the latter part of your question, Senator. I do think that the budget submission is adequate to the current task load at SMDC.

I also would agree with the Secretary that the role of space in support of ground military operations is vital. As you know, we have done some war gaming on a day without space, and what that might mean in terms of global positioning, precision weapons, and all of that. So we clearly understand the importance of it.

I am quite confident that SMDC, as an Army subcomponent command of Strategic Command is well placed and well represented, but we will keep an eye on it.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state from the outset that we are all going to be facing difficult decisions in the days and months and years ahead relative to the budget, and I am hoping that we can work on sensible efficiencies within the military. It is clearly our number one constitutional responsibility, and we want to make sure we are adequately prepared and adequately funded to do that.

Yet, at the same time, I think all of us have to stretch a little bit—and some more than others—to find those efficiencies and do more with less. So I look forward to working with the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense in finding that right balance.

General, congratulations to you. It is a great complement to your service. I had the pleasure of knowing you before, and we served together—not together, but working with you on a number of items in Germany when I was there. So the highest congratulations. It is a great honor, and I think the President made the best selection he could possibly make.

Congratulations to you also, Mr. Secretary.

I want to get just a little bit parochial here and ask you a question just more for information purposes.

MILITARY VEHICLES

It is my understanding that DARPA is now conducting ballistic tests on the new high mobility multipurpose vehicle, one with a stovepipe which provides protection for our troops. It comes in at less weight, considerably less weight, more mobility, one-third of

the cost, and so forth of the MRAP. How do you see that playing out relative to the current budget situation and relative to your needs?

My understanding is we are not getting the mobility out of the MRAP's that we need to get around in Afghanistan. A lot of them are not being used for that purpose. We now have something under test and evaluation that perhaps can give us that mobility at less cost and still provide security and safety for our soldiers. So could you comment on that?

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes, I could. I have actually not seen the test in person, but I have seen the video. And watching it is pretty impressive. And as you noted, Senator, one of the problems we have with our Humvee fleet is the reluctance that commanders have had sending it outside, as we say, the wire because of the problems on survivability. And this stack defeat system holds a great deal of promise, and it is exciting. As you noted, it is in analysis and testing right now. So we are not sure exactly how it would fit, but it is something that we are very, very interested in and we intend to pursue it to its fullest.

I am not necessarily suggesting we should limit it to a Humvee system. If it works in one configuration, it may work in others. So we want to take a broad-based look at it, and AM General, the company that brought the technology first to us, is working with us, and we appreciate that. As I said, we are excited about it.

Senator COATS. General, could you comment also, but also relative to the question of the mobility and accessibility and need for something like this in Afghanistan vis-a-vis the MRAP's?

General DEMPSEY. Well, it is, Senator. We have approximately 150,000 tactical wheeled vehicles in the Army. Some of them are intended for deployable purposes, some not. And as we look at our fleet, we have got to balance the existing inventory of MRAP vehicles and what they bring. And they did bring a considerable degree of protection at a very important time. And then the Humvee and then the other program, of course, that we are involved with, the Marine Corps and its JLTV, the joint light tactical vehicle.

What we need to do is, again, determine what is that Army of 2020, what is the capability that it needs, and then have essentially a menu of options so that based on the threat we anticipate, we can employ the right capability. And I think that Humvee will be part of that in the future, but I cannot today say what part of that.

Senator COATS. Thank you.

ABRAMS TANK

One more question. The Abrams tank, M1A2, is scheduled—my understanding—to end production in 2013. Could you comment on—concerns have been raised with me relative to maintaining the skills and industrial base necessary to produce this type of component for you. Can you give me your thoughts on that and where we might be going with that program?

Mr. MCHUGH. And those are legitimate concerns and we share them. The decision on the future production of the tank was simply made on the business case. The business case was clear. We, as I mentioned earlier, have an Abrams tank inventory that is amongst

the most modern of any of our equipment, the average age being just over 2 years old. And our acquisition objective had been met. The cost of shutting down and mothballing the plant, including the cost of rebuilding the employee base, was far more economically sensible than maintaining the minimum production necessary through the period until we begin to develop a follow-on for the Abrams platform.

Having said that, we are looking very carefully and working with DOD and Dr. Ash Carter and his acquisition folks to see what, if anything, we can do that can help preserve that expert force. These are not folks that you just find on the street. They have a developed expertise. We recognize it. We value it. They have contributed, as many of our contractors have over the years, in incredibly important ways, and we want to do the right thing by them as well. But also, as you noted in your opening comments, Senator, we have got to make some hard decisions, but we are looking at it very carefully.

Senator COATS. Thank you for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, I love the names, "McHugh," "Dempsey." It sounds like an Olympic boxing team representing the United States. And listening to you two, you two really are a one-two punch for the Army. Secretary McHugh, you know, you come from knowledge on the battlefields of Congress which really takes a lot of know-how. And, of course, General Dempsey, your incredible service plus your most recent deployment in Iraq.

Let me get to my question, and it goes to the well-being of the troops, the need for resiliency, the need for their well-being.

MENTAL HEALTH

One of the most important things to deal with their mental health problems is the time at home. Now, I believe—and this is where I want to get to my question. And also the Surgeon General of the Army, General Schoomaker, said the same thing, that if you want to reduce PTSD, stress, the terrible strain on the family, have them home for a longer period of time.

Well, you know how the old wars were. You went off to war. Usually it was for 5 years at most, and when you came back, the war was over. We had surrenders and so on. That is not the case.

So here goes the question. You, meaning our Government, is saying we are going to shrink the number of men and women in the Army. Is that correct?

Mr. MCHUGH. That is the plan forward, yes, Senator.

END STRENGTH

Senator MIKULSKI. Right. And I would say a year ago that seemed like a good idea and made sense. Now we have the Jasmine Revolution. Now we have some of our colleagues who are calling for new deployments. I was at an international conference some months ago, and one of my colleagues said, let us go in Iran and take out the Guard, et cetera. You know, they put on camous for a day and they think they are it.

Then there has been this whole thing with Libya, and the President has made a decision. A regime change means boots on the ground. But that also means what is the possibility.

Then we have Syria. Then we have—there are so many unexpected consequences and dynamics in the world.

My question is that as we look at—we thought when we were out of Iraq, pulling out of Afghanistan in the way that General Petraeus and the President are recommending, that would be kind of let us come home and get on with it.

I am apprehensive that maybe we are going to need a larger standing Army to not only meet unintended things in the world, but that we have no elasticity anymore.

So, one, what are you doing for the unexpected? Would you caution Congress to think twice before we shoot off our mouth while they are asking you to shoot off the guns?

And then the other thing is, where do we get in here now with the National Guard who is really stressed and asked for one-third of the workforce, but are supposed to return to civilian jobs after 9 years of deploying them from everything from tornadoes to overseas?

So the unexpected and how do we make sure we have not only resiliency which, General Dempsey, I really want to everything I can to work with you to do that. And I believe we speak for that.

But what do you think about what I just said, Secretary McHugh?

Mr. MCHUGH. I think you point out very accurately the challenge we all have as we make very important decisions in this 2012 budget and in the years that follow on.

BOOTS ON THE GROUND: DWELL TIME

As to what we call BOG/dwell, as the Chief mentioned and you did, I do not want to simplify it because I think the issues of stress on the force and suicide are more complex than a silver bullet. The answers are not going to be like turning on a light in a dark room. It is going to be more like lifting the shades slowly.

But we know, without any doubt, that one of the key drivers of these challenges is the very short time that troops have had over the last decade at home. And depending on what kind of job you had, most of these troops were coming home for 1 year, then going back out for 1 year. Some of them in certain high-demand, low-density MOS's were getting less than 1 year at home for 1 year deployment. One of the things we have done and concentrated on is to stretch that out, and because, in large measure, of the drawdown in Iraq, we are now, on average, at about 1 year deployed and about 1.6 years back home. We think at a minimum, we need to have 2 years back home.

Senator MIKULSKI. I understand that and I support that. But given the numbers that you are having here in the budget, do you think that there is enough elasticity, enough—you do not want to use the term “redundancy” in the troops, but enough manpower—and this is all based on the assumption that nothing new will happen—

Mr. MCHUGH. That is true.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. And that the Nation will not ask them for nothing new to do or Congress does not go off on yet some urging of them to undertake a mission.

Mr. MCHUGH. That is exactly true.

Senator MIKULSKI. So my question is, is there that elasticity there to do that, or are we just making a plan that is going to be unrealistic and then we are going to have to ramp it up and place an even further intense stress on them while all of us in this room want to work with you on that mental health care, the right PTSD, the help for the families which are so essential to recovery and re-setting and resiliency? Do you think you have that?

Mr. MCHUGH. I think it is our responsibility to provide it, and I think we have charted a way forward by which that will happen. I cannot predict the future. As you said, it is uncertain at best. Secretary Gates mentioned it in his speech at West Point that we have a perfect record in predicting the future. We have been wrong 100 percent of the time.

But what we do know is that under the current conditions and under the way that we now know forward, the drawdown we have planned, beginning with the temporary end strength starting in March of next year and then the 27,000 drawdown beginning in 2015 and 2016 is doable and is doable in a way that will provide the BOG/dwell that we think is necessary and hopefully, we believe, sufficient to return to normal stress levels at garrison.

If conditions change, then we are going to have to reevaluate. And that is why, as I mentioned earlier, the Chief and I and the entire Army staff are looking through total Army analysis to how we ramp those drawdowns in the months ahead so that if conditions change, we have the flexibility to stop and then to build up to whatever level.

Senator MIKULSKI. But conditions are changing. They are changing by the tweet.

I know you. You are an outstanding public servant and you are a man of honor. I believe you are all putting your best thinking in it, but there is these other events.

I know my time is up. I think we need to talk really more about this issue so that we are prepared. We could always buy more equipment, but you cannot always buy more troops as if you can pull them in off the shelf. We have already pulled them off of the shelf for 9 years.

So my time is up, unless General Dempsey—

General DEMPSEY. No. I just would add very briefly if you ask me the question today, yes, we are both elastic. We use the term “expansible.” This budget that we are here to discuss provides us the flexibility we need.

BALANCED FORCE

As we look forward, we know there are changes coming. The key for us in making those changes is to have time to balance what are essentially three rheostats in maintaining a balanced force, and those three rheostats are manning, manpower, modernization or equipment, and operations and maintenance and training. If decisions come to us precipitously, oftentimes we will lose one of those

three rheostats, and then we lose the flexibility. If they come to us deliberately, we can do this.

And by the way, it took us 10 years to build the magnificent Army we have today. It is not one that can be disassembled overnight.

Senator MIKULSKI. And we do not want to.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary McHugh and General Dempsey, good to see you both. Secretary McHugh was my neighbor across the lake for years when he served in the House and I enjoyed very much my work with him during that time. I found him to be extraordinarily dedicated not only to his district but to making Government work right, and it is nice to see you here.

Mr. MCHUGH. Good to see you, Senator. Thank you.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Senator LEAHY. I want to thank both of you for all the work you do to improve the lives of soldiers in the Vermont Army National Guard, but of course across the entire Army. As you know, Vermont's 86th Infantry Brigade deployed to Afghanistan last year. As members of the brigade returned home, usually my wife and I would be there to greet them as they came back. I saw that the warrior transition system designed for active duty soldiers was not meeting the needs of our Guard. We worked together to set up a new pilot program, as you know, at Fort Drum, and that was a big step forward.

A month ago, I asked General Schoomaker if he would help me to continue the National Guard outreach programs in Vermont and around the country. It is so important for mental health services for our Guard, and my colleague, Senator Sanders, and others helped to establish it. And with the help of the Army, the Vermont Guard has received the funding it needs to extend this to fiscal year 2011 and it is an impressive example of what the Army can do and what it has done.

And I should also mention I hear from my staff, one of your liaison officers, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly Laurel, represented both you and the Army on these issues and has been extremely helpful. So it is a long way around of just saying I want to thank you. When we have brought up issues that affected us, you have been there to help. I wear two hats, one as a member of this subcommittee, but also along with Senator Lindsay Graham as co-chair of the Guard Caucus, and when we have called on you for help, you have always been there.

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

Secretary McHugh, I would like to ask you about the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or MEADS. The Army has asked for another \$800 million for its development 2002–2013. I understand it will not be purchased even after it is developed. Somehow we are in an international agreement that obligates the spending.

We are having to pay so many cuts both in the civilian life and our social safety net but also in the military. Why do we not just

cut off money for MEADS? We are not going to deploy it anyway. Do we just need to renegotiate whatever those international agreements are?

Mr. MCHUGH. That would be ideal if we were successful in getting our international partners to renegotiate.

This was a litany of bad choices. The reality is, based on the negotiated agreement of 2004 that I was not a part of, so I cannot speak to the motivations, any one of the three partners—and as you know, Senator, our two other international partners are Italy and Germany—who unilaterally withdraw are required to pay the set closeout costs, which in the case of MEADS is about \$840 some million. So if we were to cancel the program today unilaterally, we would bear a bill that would be almost identical to the budget proposal that the administration has put forward.

Now, the difference is for the \$804 million that the President has requested and that the Army fully supports is that that will fund our participation through and into 2014. And at that time, we will be able, along with our international partners, to at least reap some of the technology that has been developed under the years that this program has been going forward. I cannot tell you at this point what that technology package will look like, but we know it will be of some substance. We will probably have applicability to 360 degree systems that right now are beyond our current capabilities. But it will be far more than the nothing we will get if we were to cancel unilaterally today.

Senator LEAHY. But these other countries must be spending money and they must be asking themselves whether they want to continue too. Is it a case that everybody wants to see who goes first, or is it a case where we might sit down with them and say, hey, look, guys, all this money we are spending—if we want to do something together, why do we not spend it on something that might work?

Mr. MCHUGH. I cannot speak to the motivations of our partner nations. And it is important to note, the Army is the executive agent here. We do not negotiate it. It is a Department of Defense and a Department of State lead on those things. But my understanding is, according to what I have been told through OSD, that our two partner nations, for whatever reasons, are not interested in coming to an agreement of early termination prior to 2014.

Senator LEAHY. Well, I raise it and please keep it on your radar screen because I worry about it when we are cutting out so many other things. It is a big hunk of change.

General DEMPSEY. Senator, could I add related to another question about the importance of air defense? What we do get out of this, besides the technology, is a better increased capability by our partners at a time when our particular air defense community is at any given time 50 percent deployed. So 50 percent of our air defenders are either in a deployment cycle or forward deployed. Anything we can do to improve the capability of our partners is worth the investment.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD THREE STAR

Senator LEAHY. My last question. Secretary McHugh, we have had 2 years that the Army National Guard has been without a full

three-star director. And last year, Kit Bond and I, when he was in the same position as Senator Graham now, sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking that the position be filled. I understand there have been two nominees. A second nominee is waiting for full administration clearance before his name is sent to the Senate for confirmation.

General Carpenter has been doing a great job, but can you kind of prod them? Please encourage them to get this moving.

Mr. MCHUGH. I can, I think, do better than that. I had a meeting with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on this this week. He is the guy I have kind of asked to spearhead it. It has actually been administrative problems and certain issues that the current nominee had to work through. I have been informed this week that we are at the very end of that process, and I think we will hopefully have you a nominee up here in the very near future.

Senator LEAHY. That would be very good.

Again, thank you both. I agree with so many others that sit here. We are very proud of your service. I am delighted to see you both here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator COLLINS.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, General, congratulations on your new position.

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

Recently I welcomed home a company from the Maine National Guard which had returned from a 9-month tour of duty in Afghanistan. And it was a great day of celebration and happiness. But when I was looking at these men and women, I could not help but think about the mental health challenges that many of them will face, particularly in light of the alarming increase in suicides among our National Guard and Reserve members.

I know that in your budget you have proposed a new prevention program, and I believe it is called the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention.

My concern, however, is how is this program going to reach the Reserve and National Guard. Obviously, those who go back to an active duty base have support structures already built in easily accessible, readily available. They have people in the command structure watching out for them. But those who are going back to rural towns in Maine resuming their civilian lives, do not have those kind of support structures. And I think that is one reason you are seeing this alarming increase that is not present in the active duty troops.

Could you comment on how the program you have proposed will reach those guardsmen and women, those reservists who are going back to their civilian lives?

General DEMPSEY. Yes. Thank you, Senator.

What I would like to do is offer that someone would come over and actually brief you on the entire program so that we can show you where I think we are probably going to hit the mark and show you where we think we may still miss the mark slightly.

But I will tell you this program was designed and developed from the ground up from its inception to address all three components of our Army, Active, Guard, and Reserve. And so going in, we recognized the different challenges that each of those components have, and we would like to brief you on that.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I do think that it is absolutely critical that we recognize that there are a lack of mental healthcare providers in rural areas of my State and I suspect throughout the country, and I am just really worried about getting those individuals, who are going back to rural communities to their old lives who lack that kind of support structure, those services.

Mr. MCHUGH. May I respond briefly, Senator Collins?

Senator COLLINS. Yes, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MCHUGH. And it is a huge problem. And as you noted, if you are in the active component, we can get our hands on you far more easily than when they go back.

The interesting thing about the reserve component and Guard soldiers, 50 percent of these soldiers who commit suicide in the Guard and Reserve have never deployed. So we have other issues. And the comment earlier about we do not want to look for the one silver bullet, I think, particularly applies to the Guard and Reserve. And what we are trying to do—and one part, as you mentioned, is overcome this nationwide challenge in both the civilian, as well as the military sector, to get enough behavioral health specialists so that everybody, all three components have accessibility to that to extend through distance technologies, IT, into the home so that we can provide them, first of all, predeployment resiliency tools; second of all, those resiliency tools as follow-up, but also to continue to assess their mental health when they have gone back home.

In States like Vermont and other places, the Guard units and the TAG's have stepped up and helped enormously. We are looking at everything from the Yellow Ribbon program reintegration program and such. But the distance challenges are going to provide hurdles that frankly we do not know yet how we are going to get over.

Senator COLLINS. It is something that we are going to have to keep working on.

ALS/LOU GEHRIG'S DISEASE

Secretary McHugh, I want to bring up an issue. I know you are aware of a tragic case that I have been working directly with you on of a 33-year-old sergeant who has ALS, Lou Gehrig's disease. He has three young children. He is now in the advanced stage of the disease. It has to be the saddest constituent meeting that I have had in quite some time.

And as you are well aware, numerous studies funded by DOD, the VA, NIH, and the Institutes of Medicine have found a link between military service and ALS. And that link led the VA in 2008 to establish a presumption of service connection regardless of whether there is a gap between when the ALS manifested itself. And yet, DOD takes a different approach.

In this particularly tragic case, at first we received a letter saying that the sergeant was going to qualify for benefits and that his ALS was the result of military service. We then just 1 week ago

subsequently received a letter that said the opposite. And I want to continue to work with you about that.

DISABILITY RATING SYSTEMS

But on a broader issue, I am troubled that the VA and the Department of Defense have different standards in this area. The VA assumes there is a presumption of connection between military service and ALS, and yet as this latest letter in this case shows, the Army concludes otherwise. We have been trying to have a better integration between DOD and the VA, and the conflicting rulings in Sergeant Kennedy's case seemed to run completely counter to the intent of the new integrated disability evaluation system and the recommendations of the Dole-Shalala report.

So my broader question for you is would it not make sense for there to be more consistency between the system used by the VA and the system used by DOD.

Mr. MCHUGH. It would make the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, Coast Guard lives a lot easier.

As I visit warrior transition units—and the case that you have been, to your credit, if I may, so aggressively trying to advance and remediate is a particularly tragic example of it. But every time I go to a WTU, I do not hear, usually, about bad medical care, bad food. I hear about this disconnect in the disability rating system between military and the VA. And this is something that Secretaries Shinseki and Gates in fact had a meeting at the Pentagon about 3 weeks ago in an effort to take it to their level to try to see what they could do to finally overcome the hump. Even when we had the IDES program, there are places where we have enacted it at Fort Carson, for example, where it actually expanded the disability rating system rather than helped it. So it has been very, very problematic.

When I received your letter, to narrow it down now to the case that you spoke about, I asked that our Army folks—and there is a DOD equity here. So we have to kind of work at a higher level. But I have asked our Army folks—I told them I have a personal interest in this and let us see if there is any possible way we can work this out. I cannot make you a promise other than I promise you we are looking at it hard.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and your testimony.

ALS AND CONNECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE

I want to thank you, Senator Collins, for bringing up not only the suicide issue, which I think we are all so keyed in on, but this issue of ALS and the connection within the military. It is something that I have been following for a period of years now as I have a relative that is struggling with this terrible disease. But what we are learning in these past few years about the connections to those who are serving and to this horrible disease is really quite significant.

I think most of us associate Lou Gehrig's disease with those that are older. What we are seeing now with the number of veterans are contracting this disease at an early, early age—I was at the ALS conference here in Washington, DC a couple weeks ago, and they had brought in, I think was, about 30 different veterans from around the country who are relatively young who have ALS. And how we reconcile what Senator Collins has been talking about—but again, I think appreciating perhaps what is going on with the nature of this disease that we know so little about.

So I understand your commitment to Senator Collins here to look into this one specific case, but I do believe that we need to look much more broadly. We do have the research program that DOD helps to fund through the disease-specific programs. I think we need to encourage that. But it is an issue that I find very, very troubling.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

General, I want to ask you this morning about where we are in terms of improving how we deal with IED's. I think this has been so frustrating over the years. We recognize that this is the number one killer on the battlefield, and yet our sources are indicating that our ability to detect and really to defeat these IEDs has remained relatively level versus improved.

I was out at Walter Reed on Monday and met with an airman who was an explosive ordnance disposal technician. I found it absolutely fascinating to learn that his position, his job requires that he go in and render this IED safe, but he does that through a paintbrush and a knife on his belly.

And we talked about the robots and whether or not the robots were as effective as they might be. I will tell you that when we look at what we are able to do on Mars with a robot, when we think back to a year ago under water with the Deepwater Horizon and what we were able to detect a mile below the surface, it seems incredible to me that we really have not made the progress that we would hope when it comes to how we handle the IED's.

Can you give me an update, give me a little more optimism?

General DEMPSEY. I would be loathe to give you optimism because as long as there is one soldier at risk for the technology—you know, I think we all should remain sort of pessimistic.

I cannot speak to that one airman's experience, but the technology has actually progressed remarkably. And in some ways actually we have moved away from technological solutions and back to things like bomb-sniffing dogs. So, for example, our brigades in southern Afghanistan, which are the brigades taking the greatest number of IED strikes, are all now outfitted with tactical dog teams. We give them an acronym naturally called TEDS that have been delivering on their training.

We have got ground penetrating radars. We have got other technologies that have sensors that seek to be able to identify the different kinds of explosives and triggering devices. Some of that is classified, of course. And our state of training and partnership with JIEDDO, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, has reaped a lot of benefits in not only defeating the device itself but defeating the network, the supply chain that delivers it.

So actually in my time in Iraq and Afghanistan, which spans roughly 7 years between 2003 and 2010, I mean, we have made exponential improvements, but we should never be satisfied with them. Of course, then we carry that to the technology to defeat the device when it explodes and MRAP technology and so forth. So we have made a lot of progress, but I would not sit here and express optimism.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And I appreciate that. I guess I was just more than a little bit disconcerted to learn that still with a milk jug and some fertilizer and some diesel, they can continue to do the kind of damage and inflict the death and the mutilation that we continue to see.

I was a little bit concerned, though, about what I learned about the robots, that in order to really be effective and be able to dig through the earth, you have got to have a heavier one, but you cannot carry the heavier ones, and the lighter ones are not effective. Are we doing more with that technology or is that going away as we get more dogs?

General DEMPSEY. No, not at all. In fact, we continue to look for opportunities with robotics not only in encountering IED's but even the technology that might some day produce vehicles that are robotic so we do not put soldiers on roads that we know are susceptible to mining and IED's. So we are pursuing robotic technology aggressively.

ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX

Senator MURKOWSKI. One last quick question, if I may, and this relates to the joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex regarded as one of the finest joint training ranges in the Nation, I think perhaps the world, certainly when it comes for preparedness for cold-climate battlefields. When I flew over Afghanistan, I looked down and it looks like home. It looks like Alaska with the mountains and the terrain there.

We have been doing a pretty good job with the Alaska troops in terms of training on the range, but I am a little bit disappointed that the Army does not make broader use of this tremendous resource for training a larger number of troops to fight in our cold climates. And I guess I would just ask if you agree that in fact we do have superior training range capability up there when it comes to the cold climate and if that is the case, what we can do to perhaps encourage the Army to perhaps make more extensive utilization of what we have up north.

General DEMPSEY. Well, I could not argue against the fact that you have the best cold, and we cannot replicate cold the way you can anyplace else in our country. That is for sure.

And we are excited about the potential that that facility brings and the joint capability that it brings as well.

As you know, part of our challenge in using it especially to deliver cold weather training right now is we are consumed in a cycle of deployments and preparation for deployment that really is based on the exact opposite climate challenges. And so as these particular conflicts wane, I think we will seek opportunities to expand our training, and I would certainly be open to the use of that facility.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We look forward to working with you. Thank you. Thank you both for your service.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Thank you to both of our witnesses today. Nice to see you here. I apologize for being late. I was chairing a Veterans Affairs Committee where we had a joint hearing with the DOD and the VA to talk about the warrior transition units and the fact that we are still seeing a lot of delays and seriously concerned about the high percentage of suicide rates on our warrior transition units and people still waiting. So we are working.

But I would say to the chairman and to Senator Collins, who brought it up, we are seeing both the DOD and VA work together better today than we have in the past, and I do want to thank you and commend you for that.

One area that I am really focusing on at the VA is the high unemployment rate for our service members who are exiting, much higher than their peers, 27 percent. And I recently introduced The Hiring Heroes Act to start to address how we can better transition our service members with these tremendous skills that they learn on the ground for us, whether it is a mechanic or driving a truck or whether they work in healthcare. Whatever their service is, they have tremendous experience, but they come out and they cannot translate that into a skill in the civilian side and end up unemployed at very high rates.

TRANSITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

In my legislation, I mandate that the transition assistance program become mandatory for all service members. That effort will go beyond the required pre-separation counseling that we currently see many soldiers receive, but actually say what did you do in the service and what are the skills and experience you have and how can we translate that into a career once you leave.

I wanted to ask you, General Dempsey, today what percentage of soldiers currently use the TAP program that is available?

General DEMPSEY. Well, again, one of the realities of the pace of operations is that we have not been using our ACAP programs and other transition assistance programs to the extent that we should. And so we have got to find a way to jump start, if you will, or rekindle the interest in it because 15 years ago, it was mandatory and we met the gates necessary to transition.

And I will just tell you. We feel an obligation to do better at this not only because we owe it to our transitioning soldiers, but it is an enormous cost to us as well to pay the unemployment insurance. So we agree with your concern.

Senator MURRAY. Yes. I am startled by the rapidly increasing cost of unemployment insurance. For the Army alone, it has gone from \$500 million in 2010 to \$800 million in 2011. That is a cost that, obviously, we all have to pay for, but it is a cost in lives too for these young men and women who come out and do not get a job and become disillusioned, and we see the results in everything

from drug and alcohol abuse to divorce rates to suicide. So it is a cost to society as well as a cost to the services.

So this is something I am very focused on. I would like you to take a look at my legislation. I would love to see your support in getting that done because I think it is an obligation that we have to meet.

I do know that the Army recently conducted a holistic review of the ACAP transition program, and I really am looking forward to see the results of that review and a timeline for implementing it and wondered if you could share with me today what the timeline is for completing that assessment and when Members of Congress will be briefed on it.

Mr. MCHUGH. If I may, Senator. Thank you for your efforts there. We always recognize our responsibility to take care of soldiers when they are in the Army and service. We are beginning to recognize we have got to go beyond that and help them—

Senator MURRAY. And the Nation pays a lot for the experience that they get there. We should benefit from it.

Mr. MCHUGH. Absolutely. And we need to do a better job helping employers understand the incredible talent that these young—largely young—soldiers bring to the field.

Under the ACAP program, it is our intent right now to put out an RFP this October. We would look for that RFP to establish three main locations and 15 satellite locations for the ACAP program for demobilization locations to begin to provide that. And we are also looking at how do we meld the ACAP initiative with some of our existing employment programs. We have partnership programs with the Fortune 500 companies and others, and bringing those two together seamlessly seems to us to be a very logical place by which employers who already recognize the value of these soldiers. So as we plan right now, you should begin to see some real changes in this fall.

Senator MURRAY. In this fall. Okay. I look forward to that.

And I did want you to know I am very supportive of the Joint Base Lewis-McChord ACAP model. They provide 70 hours of transition over 12 months. So rather than just putting somebody in a class a few days before they leave and they could care less, they actually are looking at what they are doing a year before they leave and saying you may need to do something additional if you want to get a job in the civilian world. And I think that is a very smart investment.

Can you tell me when the pilot of that model begins by any chance?

Mr. MCHUGH. As I said, we have to set out and make the contract let this fall. I do not expect once that is done, it should not be too long from enactment, but if I may, let us go back and get you some more detail on that.

Senator MURRAY. All right. I just do not want to lose anybody else here.

Mr. MCHUGH. Understood.

Senator MURRAY. I think we have got a lot of soldiers transitioning and a few months means a few hundred more soldiers who are getting left behind.

All right. Well, I look forward to working with both of you. I would like you to take a look at our legislation and would love to have your help and support with it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I have a lot of questions to ask, but I will submit them to you for your consideration.

WEIGHT OF COMBAT GEAR

But I have one question. Ten years ago, the Army Science Board made a study, and after that study, they recommended that no soldier should carry more than 50 pounds of gear. Today, it is estimated that the weight of the gear that a soldier carries is 125 pounds. As a result, musculoskeletal injuries have increased tenfold in the last 4 years. And the cost of medical benefits or disability benefits exceed this annually \$500 million.

And Johns Hopkins just made a study that indicates that injuries from musculoskeletal spinal injuries are double that of combat injuries.

Do you have anything to say to that?

General DEMPSEY. Only that this is a constant issue on our minds and the minds of Training and Doctrine Command, as well as the acquisition side of our Army. And we are looking at it in two parallel paths: one that you are very familiar with, which is the work on lightening the individual soldier's load. And we have made some progress with plate carriers, the weight of the helmet, the weight of optics on the rifle, the weight of the boots. But frankly, those are kind of marginal changes. They are important changes but they tend to be marginal changes.

The other path is to do what I mentioned in my opening statement, Senator, which is look at the Army from the bottom up. What does a squad need, to take one example, in terms of power and energy because we have introduced so many new emitters that we have actually increased the burden because of the batteries required to run the emitters. We have connected the individual soldier to this network, but it requires power and energy to maintain it. So by looking at the squad, what we hope to find out is what are the squad's power and energy needs not just the individual soldier. And we might find our way forward in bringing capabilities to the squad external to the individual soldier, whatever that happens to be, robotic devices, some kind of automotive mule to take some of the load off the individual soldier.

But I can only assure you that it is probably a weekly issue for the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I hope that lends the gravity to the issue that you would expect.

Chairman INOUE. As one who served in the infantry, I feel for them because I believe my combat gear never exceeded 20 pounds, including by rifle, boots, helmet, grenades, and all that ammo I carried. So I hope we can lighten the load and lighten the injuries. What shocked me was the Johns Hopkins report that indicated that musculoskeletal injuries exceed combat injuries twice.

General DEMPSEY. Senator, could I add something to that, though? Part of the reason, we have also discovered, that young men and women coming in the Army today are not as fit or as skel-

etally sound as you were. And what I mean by that is the proliferation of bad nutritional habits and carbonated beverages. Even in basic training before we load the soldier with the gear that eventually they will have to learn to bear, we have these same kind of musculoskeletal injuries. It is really a generation of Americans that have this problem, but it is exacerbated by the load we ask them to bear.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, and we thank you for your service to our Nation. And we look forward to working with you on all the problems that you brought up today.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY JOHN M. MCHUGH

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

FISCAL YEAR 2012 EFFICIENCIES

Question. Secretary McHugh, with the current state of our economy, the Nation is challenged with becoming good stewards of our valuable resources. One of the major themes of the fiscal year 2012 budget submission is cost-savings as a result of efficiencies. The Army contributed \$2.7 billion in fiscal year 2012 and plan to contribute \$30 billion over fiscal years 2012–2016. How confident are you that these savings will come to fruition?

Answer. The Army is confident projected efficiency savings will be realized. We understand that savings resulting from better business processes may take years to materialize, so we focused our efficiencies during the first 3 years of the program in two limited areas: weapons systems with declining relevance or unnecessary redundancy, as identified through comprehensive capability portfolio reviews, and a balanced facilities strategy that reduces military construction by leveraging investment in Base Operations Support (BOS) and Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM).

Of the approximately \$9 billion of savings associated with better business practices, reorganizations, and contract management, \$8 billion is projected to be realized in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. This phased approach provides the time needed to develop and successfully implement future initiatives.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Question. Secretary McHugh, the American people recognize that soldiers and families make considerable sacrifices as they serve to defend the Nation. Because of these sacrifices, the Army has dedicated a large amount of manpower and resources toward a full range of support programs. Are any of these programs at risk in the Department's efforts to find efficiencies?

Answer. Army family programs are not at risk in the Department's efforts to find efficiencies. Because of the tremendous sacrifices our soldiers and their families make every day, the Army has committed to provide them with the best possible family support services to enhance readiness, retention, and resiliency. We have resourced fiscal year 2012 family programs to provide soldiers and families with a quality of life commensurate with their level of service and sacrifice to the Nation. Army family programs serve Active and Reserve Component soldiers and families whether they reside on or near an installation, or are geographically dispersed. The Army continually evaluates the quality, cost, and value of these programs. Our efforts ensure a balanced portfolio of services that are fiscally sustainable to strengthen soldier and family programs for the long term.

FUTURE FORCE MIX

Question. Secretary McHugh, while trying to make decisions on the composition of the future force mix, how will you make sure the Army can maintain its battle-

proven current capabilities and invest in future capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment?

Answer. We have an Army that is poised to prevail in the current fight. We will smartly manage the reduction and change in size and composition along with changes in the demand for overseas contingency operations. We will sustain the warfighting capabilities to prevail, even as we increase our ability to prevent conflict. We will ensure full spectrum operational readiness and continue important modernization programs as we correctly apply efficiency efforts across our training, manning and other title 10 activities.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Question. Secretary McHugh, the fiscal year 2012 budget includes over \$1 billion for the Ground Combat Vehicle. This is a 7-year development program that will cost over \$40 billion. However, the Ground Combat Vehicle will replace less than half of your combat vehicle fleet, and your budget contains little funding to modernize those vehicles. Is this modernization strategy truly affordable?

Answer. The Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy, including the development and fielding of the Ground Combat Vehicle, is affordable. The Army conducted a rigorous analysis to determine an affordable cost for the Ground Combat Vehicle. After examining planned modernization efforts and new start programs across the combat vehicle fleet, the Army determined a Ground Combat Vehicle with a \$13 million Average Procurement Unit Cost is affordable. The Army included a cost target range in the Request For Proposals, encouraging industry to submit proposals the Army can afford.

We require a new ground combat vehicle to provide soldiers the protected mobility they need to operate across the full spectrum of operations. Nine years of combat experience, ranging from major combined-arms maneuver and close combat action, to stability operations and security force assistance missions, have underscored this need. Current and product-improved Infantry Fighting Vehicles do not provide the protected mobility required to operate across the spectrum of operations or the growth potential required to incorporate advances in protection or network capabilities for the full infantry squad.

Question. Secretary McHugh, we understood that savings generated by the Army during the Department's efficiency initiative were going to be reinvested in combat vehicle modernization. Could you please detail for us where and when those funds will be invested?

Answer. A sizeable portion of the funds from the efficiency initiative will be applied from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017 in support of the Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy. The Army will take a holistic approach to the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle, replacement of the M113 Family of Vehicles and the incremental modernization of the Bradley, Abrams, Paladin, and Stryker. Modernization imperatives across the fleet include improved protection, lethality, mobility and sustainment, mitigation of existing Space, Weight and Power (SWaP) shortfalls and Network integration.

HEALTHCARE PROPOSALS

Question. Secretary McHugh, the increases in co-pays have been proposed previously. Could you explain how these proposals are different and why they should be reconsidered by the Congress at this time?

Answer. Previous proposals sought higher enrollment fees and higher pharmacy co-pays than the current proposal. While the cost of military healthcare has continued to grow because of an increase in eligible beneficiaries, expansion of benefits, increased healthcare utilization, and the growth in health inflation, TRICARE premiums have remained the same since the TRICARE program began in 1995. These fiscal year 2012 proposals balance our commitment to preserve the healthcare benefit while slowing future growth in healthcare costs through various healthcare efficiencies. The Army believes these proposals to raise the TRICARE enrollment fees for working age retirees and adjust retail pharmacy co-pays for all beneficiaries except Active Duty to be modest, gradual, and responsible.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

SUICIDE

Question. The Congress has established a national suicide hotline for returning troops, as well as increased funding for mental health programs for Active Duty military personnel. However, there remain a high number of soldier suicides. For

example, it was reported that 21 suicides involving Fort Campbell soldiers alone occurred in 2009. What preventative measures are the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) taking to address this problem writ large and at Fort Campbell in particular?

Answer. The Army has implemented several near-term projects to improve our understanding of suicide prevention and to improve the programs and services provided to soldiers and their families—such as the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention and the Vice Chief of Staff's monthly suicide review meetings. The Army has also enlisted the help of the National Institute of Health (NIH) to conduct a long-term study on risk and resilience in the Army.

In the past year, the Army has implemented the Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care Campaign Plan. This initiative is nested under the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention. The Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care is intended to further standardize and optimize the vast array of Behavioral Health (BH) policies and procedures across the U.S. Army Medical Command. The goal is to ensure seamless continuity of care to better identify, prevent, treat, and track BH issues that affect soldiers and families.

There has been a robust Combat and Operational Stress Control presence in theater since the beginning of the war, with deployed BH assets supporting both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation New Dawn.

The Army is enhancing BH services provided to its family members through Child, Adolescent and Family Assistance Centers and the School Behavioral Health Programs.

We continue to invest significant resources in researching BH. The BH research program supports development and evaluation for prevention, treatment, and long term recovery needs. This includes over 150 projects addressing post-traumatic stress disorder and 10 projects dedicated toward suicide prevention and intervention research.

All of these programs and services are available to soldiers and their families at Fort Campbell. The soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were the first soldiers in the Army to implement the Army Campaign Plan for Warrior Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) Management. This campaign plan increased the forward screening, treatment and documentation for soldiers exposed to concussive events. The program will help the healthcare providers at Fort Campbell improve the medical care and treatment for soldiers who are displaying signs or symptoms of mTBI following their deployment. Additionally, under the direction of the Army's Assistant Surgeon General, a detailed plan for improved postdeployment behavioral health screening and treatment has been implemented. The plan increased both the number of providers on-hand at Fort Campbell, and also increased the access to behavioral health specialists through Virtual Behavioral Health.

COUNSELING SERVICES

Question. With the current deployment schedule, a heavy toll is being placed upon the spouses and children of servicemembers. How accessible are counseling services for deployed servicemembers' spouses and children?

Answer. The Army has an extensive array of behavioral health services and resources for soldiers and their families. These services include, but are not limited to, routine behavioral healthcare, School Behavioral Health Programs, Child and Family Assistance Centers, Army Community Service, the Family Assistance for Maintaining Excellence program, Warrior Resiliency Program, use of chaplains, Military One Source, and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness for Families. The Army developed its Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care Campaign Plan to standardize, synchronize, and coordinate behavioral healthcare across the Army, to optimize care and maximize limited behavioral health resources to ensure the highest care to soldiers and their families.

Question. Are these services available on all major military installations?

Answer. Yes. Counseling services are available for deployed servicemembers' spouses and children at all major installations.

Question. What programs are available for those living away from major military installations?

Answer. Eligible stateside TRICARE beneficiaries can access behavioral healthcare services through the TRICARE Assistance Program and are also eligible for counseling support through secure, two-way audio-visual conferencing to connect with authorized providers as part of TRICARE's Tele-mental Health program. Military OneSource provides access to face-to-face, telephone, online and email sup-

portive counseling services and is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for Active Duty servicemembers and their families.

IRELAND ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

Question. Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox is one of the oldest hospitals in the Army. With the new Brigade Combat Team stationed at the post, I am concerned over the state of the current hospital and its ability to meet the increased demands placed upon it. What is the status of the Army's decision on when to build a replacement?

Answer. The Army intends to replace Ireland Army Community Hospital (IACH). The current Defense Health Program Future Year Defense Program includes a phased funded replacement project for IACH beginning in fiscal year 2013.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)/TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURIES (TBI)

Question. Are there any further legislative steps that the Congress could take to improve screening and the delivery of care to soldiers with PTSD and TBI?

Answer. At this time there are no further legislative steps necessary to improve the screening of PTSD and TBI brain injury. The Army's Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care campaign plan was launched in February 2010 to standardize, synchronize, and coordinate behavioral healthcare across the Army and through the Army Force Generation cycle.

FORT KNOX

Question. With the addition of the new Brigade Combat Team at Fort Knox, what is the Army doing specifically to ensure that the installation is capable of deploying the unit with dispatch?

Answer. In March 2006, an assessment by the Transportation Engineering Agency calculated a rail deployment requirement of 360 railcars in a 48-hour period to deploy a Brigade Combat Team. In order to achieve that deployment tempo, the Army has programmed a 2014 project to upgrade the Brandenburg Station Road railhead in the fiscal year 2012 through 2016 Future Year Defense Program. The Army is currently reviewing all projects in anticipation of expected military construction reductions.

Question. What additional transportation or logistics facilities are needed to enhance Fort Knox's capabilities in this respect?

Answer. Two other projects will enhance the installation's deployment capabilities. A Container Handling Facility will support the increase in container processing that must occur for deployment. Additionally, a Vehicle/Equipment Processing Facility will assist with the tasks necessary to process the increased number of vehicles and other equipment that comes with deploying a Brigade Combat Team from the installation. Both projects are programmed to be funded in 2015 in the fiscal year 2012 through 2016 Future Year Defense Program. The Army is currently reviewing all projects in anticipation of expected military construction reductions.

SERVICEMEMBER CENSUS

Question. It is my understanding that there are at least three ways that the DOD could count servicemembers for purposes of the Census. The DOD today apparently uses "home of record" as the means of determining where servicemembers "live". This appears to be the case even though such data are often many years old. What is the policy justification for the DOD using this means of counting as opposed to other approaches, such as legal residence or last duty station, which might entail a more accurate methodology?

Answer. Using a servicemember's home of record (HOR) provides greater consistency and accuracy in the census in comparison to the other two approaches. The HOR is established at initial entry and can only be changed if there is an administrative error or when a servicemember re-enlists after having a 24-hour break in service. The HOR is also used to calculate a servicemember's Government travel expenses upon separation, therefore, returning the servicemember to the State of initial entry.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL

Question. Please provide the Program Office Estimate (POE) projected date for completion of operations for chemical weapons disposal at Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), Kentucky.

Answer. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) POE developed in 2010 estimated the completion of chemical weapons destruction operations at

Blue Grass in May 2021. During the recently completed Nunn-McCurdy review of the program, risk elements were identified that will likely extend the schedule by approximately 24 months. The ACWA program continues to evaluate options to improve the overall schedule including the consideration of the use of explosive destruction technology. A new Acquisition Program Baseline will be developed by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011.

ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALTERNATIVES (ACWA)

Question. I am told that the Office of the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Initiatives memorandum, dated March 14, abolishes the Program Manager position of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA). I am concerned that abolishing the ACWA Program Manager could leave the program without the leadership necessary to fulfill the mission—unless the Chemical Materials Activity Director remains as interim ACWA Program Manager indefinitely. I believe clarity is needed as to who is going to take long-term responsibility of the ACWA mission, consistent with existing law. If the reports are true, what impact would eliminating this position have on chemical weapons disposal efforts and the greater ACWA mission at BGAD?

Answer. In accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Efficiency Initiatives Decisions memorandum dated March 14, 2011, the Program Manager, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (PM ACWA) Senior Executive Service (SES) position was eliminated.

However, as a result of the ACWA Program Nunn-McCurdy review, the Secretary of the Army is tasked to establish and fill the PM ACWA position by the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. Pursuant to section 1421 of Public Law 111-383, the PM ACWA shall report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) Director, Mr. Conrad Whyne, is the Acting PM ACWA, and will manage the ACWA program until the position is permanently filled.

The DOD understands the importance of the ACWA Program and will continue to maintain long-term responsibility and the essential management structure for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles in Kentucky and Colorado.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INNOVATION

Question. Secretary McHugh, in the Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations bill passed last month the Congress provided the Army with \$105 million for “Research and Development Innovation”. This was a new program line for the Army and the bill contained no explicit language prescribing the uses of that money. Does the Army currently have a detailed plan for how the \$105 million will be spent?

Answer. The Army is developing guidance for the execution of the \$105 million Rapid Innovation Program. We currently plan on defining a set of broad topic areas of importance to the Army, and issuing Request For Proposals (RFPs) on these topics. The RFPs should be issued in the next several months.

Question. Will the Congress be briefed on a spending plan in the near future?

Answer. Detailed plans will be provided to the Congress when the Army finalizes guidance for the Rapid Innovation Program, which should occur in the next several months. The Army will also provide regular reports on the use of this funding, as required by law.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. Secretary McHugh, there has been much discussion in recent weeks on the combat vehicle industrial base but there appears to be an increasing concern over the weapon system industrial base writ large. What analysis does the Army conduct on the impact of ending programs on the industrial base?

Answer. On an annual basis, the Army conducts analysis and assessments on key industrial base sectors which produce weapon systems and critical components. The broad assessments and sector studies are utilized to make informed industrial base investment decisions, to include decisions on program termination impacts. These Army industrial base assessments are summarized in the Annual Industrial Base Report to the Congress. As an example of an Army assessment of ending combat vehicle production, the Army assessed and determined it prudent to temporarily close our primary assembly plant for heavy vehicles but keep critical suppliers like

special armor in active production status to protect our ability to restart production. As a result, the Army programmed needed funds to maintain that capability.

Question. Is the industrial base a manageable problem from your perspective?

Answer. Yes, however the current decline in the number of suppliers, a lack of surge capability, a dependence on foreign sources of supply, and a low-productivity growth rate in some important industries could prove to be challenging. We need to continue pursuing comprehensive and integrated approaches to determine which industrial capabilities are unique and vital to our national defense and if our military will be jeopardized if a company decides to terminate a vital activity or move production offshore. The national defense environment is dynamic and, unfortunately, no single criterion applies to all situations. Identifying vital, at-risk capabilities requires program managers and other logisticians to become involved.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS

Question. Secretary McHugh, recent technologies have begun to emerge which enhance the capabilities of our tactical assets to acquire, target and mitigate enemy rocket and mortar fire from the ground. How does the Army assess advancements in targeting sensors, missile guidance and control, and seeker technologies? Will the department pursue miniaturized, cost-effective, and deployable force protection systems?

Answer. There have been significant advancements in targeting sensors, missile guidance and control, and seeker technologies. The Army has ongoing Science and Technology investments to mature and evaluate these technologies. We plan to demonstrate their ability to target and mitigate enemy rocket and mortar fire over the next few years.

We have sought enhancements to all baseline components to ensure the capability to acquire, target and mitigate enemy rocket and mortar fire. At the same time, we are responding to changes in insurgent tactics and weapons. We have sought both mature and emerging technologies across the various services. We are demonstrating and evaluating these and programmed enhancements to existing systems over 6 major tests/demonstrations and 20 smaller events. The Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) Program Office has integrated existing Navy, Marine Corp, and Air Force systems, in many cases employing them to perform new functions. The C-RAM Program Directorate works with DOD Program Managers of existing systems as well as the Science and Technology organizations and industry to identify technologies and systems that can improve force protection in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army is developing requirements consistent with emerging war fighter needs that provide better force protection. Miniaturization and cost-effectiveness are always considerations when developing force protection capabilities.

INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Question. Mr. Secretary, physical readiness is critical to mission success. Musculoskeletal injuries are the #1 issue inhibiting military readiness, resilience and deployability. At any given time we have a full brigade of soldiers that cannot deploy due to musculoskeletal injury. These injuries also strongly influence the quality of life in our older personnel decreasing productiveness and increasing medical costs. After Active Duty, these old injuries continue to affect the lives of our veterans. Nonetheless, the vast majority of our research funds are focused on battlefield injuries.

Today only 6 percent of the United States population meets current enlistment standards. While TRADOC has put in motion the "Soldier Athlete Initiative" and is exploring the Musculoskeletal Action Team concept within the training brigades, this leaves the largest number of soldiers (FORSCOM) without direct support in this area. In addition, if the Army were to expand its efforts beyond TRADOC, I understand there is a severe shortage in personnel, whether military, civilian DOD, or contractors, trained in sports medicine and orthopedic health available to address this critical need.

What is the Army currently doing to reduce the number of musculoskeletal injuries and the recovery time from those injuries across the Army? Please provide full background and statistics on improvement and cost savings to TRADOC, FORSCOM, and MEDCOM.

Answer. The U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has initiated its comprehensive Soldier Medical Readiness Campaign (SMRC) to address and improve the medical readiness of the Army. Under SMRC, the Office of The Surgeon General and MEDCOM are partnering with the Headquarters Department of the Army, FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Human Resources

Command, and others to promote a healthy population and ready force. The SMRC focuses on evidence-based health promotion, injury prevention, and human performance optimization. The U.S. Army is initiating/monitoring multiple programs that target both TRADOC and FORSCOM soldiers. These programs include, but are not limited to, the Initial Entry Training—Soldier Athlete Initiative, 4th Infantry Division Iron Horse Performance Optimization Program, 25th Infantry Division Advanced Tactical Athlete Conditioning Program, and the Fort Hood Physical Readiness Training Program. Additionally, the Army initiated the new Physical Readiness Training (PRT) in 2010.

This is a phased program that safely focuses on training the fundamentals first while enhancing strength, endurance, and mobility. We designed the PRT to incorporate appropriate intensity and duration of physical conditioning while allowing for adequate rest, recovery, and nutrition. A study conducted by the U.S. Army Public Health Command (Provisional) (PHC) found that soldiers in an infantry battalion were 1.2 to 1.4 times less likely to suffer an overuse injury when participating in the PRT versus traditional physical training programs.

It is still too early to draw definitive data on cost savings that have been realized from these programs. MEDCOM has ongoing collaborative efforts with PHC and U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine to identify best practices for reducing injuries, improving readiness, and subsequently reducing costs.

Question. How does the Army propose to overcome the serious lack of sports medicine and orthopedic healthcare providers it now faces?

Answer. Currently, the U.S. Army does not face a lack of sports medicine or orthopedic healthcare providers. Numerous training programs specifically address sports medicine and orthopedic training for physician providers as well as physician extender providers. Physician programs include fellowships in both orthopedics and sports medicine. Nonphysician healthcare providers also have multiple programs that offer training in these specific subspecialties. For example, physical therapists are selected each year to attend residency programs in orthopedics or in sports medicine and physician assistants are selected for attendance to an orthopedic residency program. Additionally, our medics and specialty technicians (physical therapy, occupational therapy, and dieticians) receive extensive training and education within their respective programs in orthopedic and sports injury assessment and rehabilitation.

Question. Is the Army considering the development of training protocols that will increase the number of trained healthcare providers and as importantly the ability of officers and NCO's with oversight of physical training to recognize injuries or the precursor to injuries in an effort to prevent or control injury? If not, how will this issue be addressed?

Answer. The Army has a variety of healthcare providers, from medics and primary care physicians to specialists, who are trained in sports medicine and orthopedic specialties. Numerous programs exist to sustain the current base and provide leading edge training opportunities for physician and nonphysician providers. For example, entry level training by the U.S. Army Baylor University doctoral program in physical therapy is currently recognized as a leader in orthopedic and sports physical therapy education, including injury prevention and human optimization performance training. Postgraduate education for physician and nonphysician providers extends opportunities as fellowships, residencies and short courses. These programs include, but are not limited to, the military sports medicine fellowship for primary care physicians, advanced residencies in sports medicine and orthopedics for physical therapists, occupational therapists, physician assistants and other military providers.

Question. I understand that a number of small scale efforts are underway across the Army that have shown great success and cost savings surrounding musculoskeletal injuries. Are you aware of these efforts? Has the Army considered expansion of these efforts, and what would the impact of expansion mean for readiness?

Answer. We are aware of numerous small scale efforts across the Army aimed at addressing musculoskeletal injuries. These programs include, but are not limited to, the Initial Entry Training—Soldier Athlete Initiative, 4th Infantry Division Iron Horse Performance Optimization Program, the 25th Infantry Division Advanced Tactical Athlete Conditioning Program as well as programs throughout Special Operations Command. These programs augment the Army's validated physical readiness training. Army research and public health experts seek to identify objective and valid measures for success and cost savings in these programs. The collaboration among commanders, researchers and medical experts will assist in identifying best practices in order to expand these across the Army. It will be difficult to determine the impact on readiness and efficacy in reducing the risk and incidence of musculoskeletal injury until the ongoing studies are complete.

CANINE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION

Question. Mr. Secretary, IEDs seem to be a growing issue in Afghanistan and a continuing issue in Iraq, yet statistics provided by the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) indicate little improvement in our ability to detect and defeat IEDs in theater. There is, however, one technology that has proven to have greater success—explosive detection canines. The current and previous Directors of JIEDDO, Generals Oates and Barbero, as well as General Petraeus, have all acknowledged that canine detection teams remain the best technology to detect and defeat IEDs. In fact, units with canines have an 80 percent detection rate compared to 50–55 percent detection rate for all units with differing technology.

How many detection dogs are currently deployed or being trained for deployment?

Answer. The Army has 7 Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (PEDD) assigned in Iraq. There are 174 explosive detection dogs assigned in Afghanistan: 5 PEDD, 25 Specialized Search Dogs (SSD), 12 Mine Detector Dogs (MDD) and 82 Tactical Explosive Detection Dogs (TEDD). Additionally, there are 40 TEDD teams in training.

Question. Where were these dogs bred, acquired and trained?

Answer. Procurement and training of all Military Working Dogs is the responsibility of the DOD Executive Agent (EA) thru the 341st Training and Readiness Squadron at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. Current inventory of canines are bred and acquired through domestic and nondomestic vendors. The 341st also provides dogs through their in-house breeding program.

Question. What is the Army doing to acquire more quality trained dogs for deployment?

Answer. The DOD EA continues to procure/train Military Working Dogs for the Army. Additionally, based on an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for a single purpose explosive detection capability in support of combatant commanders, the Army developed TEDD as an emergent requirement for additional capacity. Headquarters, Department of the Army validated that each deploying Brigade Combat Team will receive 20 TEDD dogs.

Question. Does the Army have standards on detection dogs that must be met by suppliers?

Answer. The DOD EA thru the 341st Training and Readiness Squadron creates and enforces the standards by which they procure dogs from a supplier. All dogs are screened and approved by veterinary personnel to ensure the dog is physically fit to meet the rigorous training standards. Once the dogs have completed training, all teams are certified by a Department of the Army certification authority before being accepted into the DOD program. Certification standards requires all teams to demonstrate the ability of finding explosives at a 95 percent find rate with a less than 10 percent false response rate. All TEDD must meet the same standards.

Question. What is the average total cost of a detector dog?

Answer. According to the 341st Training and Readiness Squadron at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, the estimated costs are \$16,000 per dog; the average cost of a Tactical Explosive Detection Dog is \$14,000 per dog.

Question. Is the Army currently conducting R&D on detection dogs and methods to increase their effectiveness? If so, please provide details including costs and successes.

Answer. The Army is not conducting any Research and Development on detection dogs, but strives to meet operational needs by incorporating lessons learned and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) directly from theater into ongoing TEDD classes. One example is the introduction of homemade explosives into the training protocol of all explosive detector dogs. Army Testing and Evaluation has conducted an initial review of the first iteration of the TEDD. The Army is in close coordination with each of the services' Military Working Dog programs to incorporate pertinent lessons learned.

Question. What is the total amount to date the Army has spent directly on or with JIEDDO on IED detection and defeat R&D and asset acquisition? What percentage of that does the most successful asset, explosive detection dogs, represent?

Answer. The Army received \$7.5 million from JIEDDO over the past 8 years for Military Working Dog programs. Of that, \$5 million was split over 2 years to develop the Specialized Search Dog program, an off leash explosive detector dog team trained by the DOD dog center at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. The remaining \$2.5 million was used to develop a combat tracking dog program in which the dog was used to track backwards from known IED sites.

We do not know what that represents as JIEDDO's total budget.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LISA MURKOWSKI

RESERVE COMPONENT DISCHARGE ISSUES

Question. In 2007, I had the opportunity to visit with Alaska Army National Guard troops who were returning from Iraq and Kuwait at Camp Shelby in Mississippi. I was particularly interested in learning whether the returning guardsmen were getting medical and psychological screening similar in quality to the screenings that our Active Duty soldiers received upon their return. I was left with the sense that there were limited opportunities for returning Guard members to get help at Camp Shelby and those who sought help were referred to an Army medical facility in the Southeast United States rather than returned home to a military treatment facility in Alaska. This created an incentive for a soldier not to express a medical concern.

In 2010, my colleague Senator Wyden of Oregon exposed the concern that Oregon National Guard members returning to Fort Lewis were being discharged without receiving adequate treatment or counseling. To add insult to injury, it appeared that some members of the Fort Lewis medical staff were exposed to a briefing that suggested members of the National Guard were gaming the system and would feign injuries in order to continue on Active Duty.

All of this was deeply troubling to me . . . confirming my worst fears when I visited with Alaska troops at Camp Shelby.

Has the Army completed its investigation of the complaints arising from Fort Lewis and what was learned?

Answer. The investigation is complete. Based upon these experiences, the Army established a Demobilization Assessment Tiger Team (DAT2) to conduct a review of the demobilization process. The Army published Execution Order 178–11: Mobilization Command Support Relationships and Requirements Based Demobilization Process on April 14, 2011 based on the DAT2 findings. DAT2 found the demobilization process lacked standardization and oversight. In other words, the soldier's experience was very different at each demobilization site which led to possible gaps in fully identifying and evaluating battlefield injuries prior to a Reserve Component soldier's discharge from Active Duty.

The solutions currently being implemented to close the gaps identified include:

- Publishing specific standards for Reverse Soldier Readiness Processing (i.e., demobilization) medical processes to include specified behavioral health tasks;
- Coordinating with TRICARE Management Activity to update and standardize the TRICARE briefing provided to each RC member; and
- Standardizing the Medical Briefing provided at each demobilization site in order to ensure each soldier has the same understanding of medical and dental screening tasks to be completed, medical evaluation and treatment options to include retention on Active Duty under medical retention processing authorities or care options if the soldier chooses to be released from Active Duty.

U.S. Army MEDCOM and its subordinate commands will continue to utilize the Organization Inspection Program and Staff Assistance Visits to ensure compliance with these new policies and procedures throughout the command.

Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that battlefield injuries sustained by members of the Reserve Component are being fully identified and evaluated before a soldier is discharged from Active Duty? I would like you to speak both to physical injuries and behavioral health issues in answering this question.

Answer. In April 2011, the Army published a Department of the Army Execution Order (EXORD) to address standardization and oversight within the demobilization process. Specific steps to fully identify and evaluate battlefield injuries before a soldier is discharged from Active Duty includes the utilization of a down-range assessment tool. This assessment is used to provide early indications of who may be at high risk for behavioral health issues so that the receiving demobilization platform is ready to care for them. Additionally, along with the postdeployment health assessment that all soldiers receive upon redeployment, U.S. Army Medical Command has implemented a Periodic Health Assessment for Reserve Component soldiers at the demobilization site to ensure a comprehensive assessment of their medical and dental readiness is documented.

To ensure proper coordination with Reserve Component commands, DA EXORD 178–11 incorporated a deployment support cell (DSC) from the Reserve Components' command into the demobilization process. The medical element of the DSC monitors and assists with line of duty completion for all soldiers requiring documentation of medical conditions sustained in the line of duty and ensuring continuity of care for those soldiers choosing to be released from Active Duty. DA EXORD 178–11 also mandates that a demobilization validation board reviews each soldier's record prior

to departure from the demobilization station in order to validate whether the soldier meets the criteria for release from Active Duty or requires further medical care.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

COMPETITION

Question. Mr. Secretary, what assurances can you give the Committee that the results of the new carbine competition will consider best value—a competitive procurement cost coupled with due consideration of the total life cycle cost of the new carbine—rather than simply awarding the contract to the lowest bidder?

Answer. The IC procurement strategy is being conducted as a full and open competition to ensure that the soldier receives the best overall weapon at the best value to the Government. Full and Open Competition permits the Army to exploit commercially available advances in small arms capabilities. In addition to cost, IC candidates will be evaluated against a number of factors, including accuracy, reliability/durability, fielding, facility capability, and operational and supportability impacts. As part of the competition, a Limited User Evaluation (LUE) will be conducted in order to obtain user assessment of the system. At the end of the competition a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) will be conducted to consider the performance, life-cycle cost, and terms and conditions of the selected system as compared to the current carbine.

Question. Do you agree that it would be wrong to the taxpayer and the soldier if the Army simply goes with the cheapest solution, only to have the contract winner potentially recoup its profit via engineering changes, delays and other modifications, as has occurred with other small arms contracts?

Answer. Yes, the IC procurement strategy is designed to ensure that the soldier receives the best overall weapon at the best value to the Government. While cost is one of many considerations, best value does not mean lowest cost. Best value also includes an array of considerations, including weapon performance and reliability in test and evaluation, past vendor performance, soldier input, and numerous other factors.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL COATS

TACTICAL RADIOS

Question. In 2009, the Army initiated the Rifleman Radio Competition Integration (RRCI) to support the test, evaluation and certification of alternative Rifleman Radio (RR) offerings to meet the warfighter's requirements at a competitive price. It is my understanding that to date, the RRCI has not been fully implemented. In January 2011, the Undersecretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum asking the Army to report back by 1 February 2011 on a new radio acquisition strategy with the twin goals of "focusing on that capability which is within reach for near term delivery to the warfighter" and "providing potential competition for production at the earliest possible time." The RRCI initiative was undertaken to increase competition, drive up the capability and drive down the cost of acquiring the RR. What is the Army doing to implement this program and are you currently expecting a higher than projected cost per radio?

Answer. The RRCI efforts have been implemented as a voluntary program for interested vendors. The RRCI program allows the vendors to complete as much, as or as little testing, at their own expense, based on their business decisions. To date, only one vendor (ITT) has participated in any Joint Program Executive Office supported testing. ITT will complete certification testing in July 2011. ITT has not indicated that they are willing or interested in participating in any further testing. Also, no other vendors have expressed any interest in participating in any testing. Nevertheless, the Rifleman full-rate production contract will be a full and open competition allowing any vendor who deems their radio technically acceptable to compete. The Unit Cost of RR is not expected to be higher than projected. The current Program of Record RR has been able to reduce the number of components in the radio while increasing reliability, resulting in a lower cost radio.

ACOUSTIC HAILING DEVICE

Question. I commend the Army for adopting a centralized acquisition strategy to acquire the advanced acoustic technology Acoustic Hailing Device (AHD) as a supplemental component of the Program Management Office of the Close Combat Systems, Joint Munitions and Lethality, United States Army located in Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. Tactical use of AHDs has the potential to save lives and deter cata-

strophic attacks, and they should be widely fielded at the earliest opportunity. Can you provide me an estimate of the acquisition schedule as well as the status of the funding required?

Answer. Based on an approved Capabilities Production Document, the Army plans to initiate the Acoustic Hailing Device (AHD) procurement program with a Material Development Decision in the 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2011, and anticipates issuing a Request For Proposal (RFP) for a Full and Open Competition by the end of the 1st Quarter, fiscal year 2012. Our market research has shown that we can expect up to six vendors to respond to the RFP. Testing and analysis of the vendor's products will consume most of the remaining fiscal year. We plan to award a contract to a single vendor in the 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2012. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget requested \$34.923 million, split between base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations funds, to procure approximately 1,209 AHDs. There is also approximately \$50 million in fiscal years 2013 through 2016 to procure additional AHDs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

FISCAL YEAR 2012 EFFICIENCIES

Question. General Dempsey, are you confident that the efficiencies that the Army has identified are in areas that could be reduced with minimal risk to operational capabilities?

Answer. The Army's efficiency initiatives proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget request do not create undue risk to operational forces. We used comprehensive capability portfolio reviews to terminate or reduce weapons systems with declining relevance or unneeded redundancy; the Army ensured training programs and equipment programs terminated, reduced or deferred would not pose a threat to its ability to conduct the full range of military operations and represented the lowest priority requirements. Army efficiency initiatives include implementing an aggressive plan to streamline management headquarters and reduce overhead by consolidating organizations. Some service and support contracts were reduced within the Army's Generating Force, leveraging investments in existing infrastructure and consolidating information technology, which will provide efficiency and maintain or improve effectiveness in supporting the Operating Force. In accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's direction for us to plan to reduce our end strength by 27,000 by fiscal year 2015, we are conducting deliberate analysis now to determine which capabilities should be reduced and how the drawdown plan will proceed to ensure that our operational capability is minimally affected.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Question. General Dempsey, the Army has worked hard over the last several years to build resilience in the force by institutionalizing programs such as the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF), the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, and Suicide Prevention. These programs teach soldiers, families, and civilians coping skills for dealing with the stress of deployments in everyday life. What role will your quality of life programs take in preparing the Army over the next decade?

Answer. The Army's senior leadership is fully committed to the well-being of soldiers, families and civilians. They have adopted two major programs to address these issues: the CSF, which is designed to build psychological strength and resilience; and the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction, which is designed to improve programs and services that identify, respond and treat individuals in need of assistance.

The CSF Program will play a significant role in quality of life of the force over the next decade. The CSF represents the Army's investment in the readiness of the force and the quality of life of our soldiers, family members, and Army civilians. It is a long-term strategy to provide soldiers the critical skills they need to take care of themselves, their families, and their teammates. The program develops the "whole person," by giving the same emphasis to psychological strength that is often given to physical strength. The CSF training focuses on increasing physical, emotional, social, spiritual, and family strengths through a program of continuous self-development and education. Additionally, mid-level noncommissioned officers from both the operating and generating forces are being taught to train resilience concepts to soldiers in their units. This enables members of the Army community to more easily manage various physical and psychological challenges in their personal

and professional lives. The program takes a deliberate approach to equip the force with the psychological tools to deal with a variety of ambiguous threats.

The Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction is the Army's method to create enduring changes to policies, programs and services that are designed for early identification of "high-risk" behavior, such as substance abuse and behavior problems, that will allow leaders to intervene early. The Army is focusing its efforts on ensuring that policies and programs are synchronized and effective. We are developing a comprehensive Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Program Portfolio to support integration across the Army while leveraging the Department of Defense (DOD), Federal, VA and civilian community-based programs, services and initiatives. The commitment of Army senior leadership and the efforts of leaders at all levels will make significant changes to the way Army does business with respect to Health Promotion and Risk Reduction. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring solutions.

FUTURE FORCE MIX

Question. Along with end strength decisions, the Army is currently assessing its future force composition. Recent press has reported that both the DOD and Army leadership have raised concerns over how the future Army will structure itself, including the size and the number and composition of its deployable units, such as combat brigades. General Dempsey, what is your assessment on the composition of the future force?

Answer. Our plan is to reduce the Army's end strength and restructure the force mix consistent with reductions in overseas contingency operations commitments and in conjunction with the needs of the Department and the combatant commanders. Even with budgetary constraints, our intent is to have the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future challenges. We will achieve this by ensuring our forces have the greatest possible versatility while maintaining core capabilities. We are conducting a deliberate analysis for 2014–2018 to determine the correct Army capabilities and force structure mix and the correct path to implement. We are also working closely with the Joint Staff in their strategic review to ensure our analysis is consistent with their ongoing efforts.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Question. General Dempsey, what added fighting capability will the Army receive from its Ground Combat Vehicle?

Answer. The Ground Combat Vehicle will provide soldiers the protected mobility they need to operate across the full spectrum of operations. It will also have the growth potential required to incorporate advances in protection or network capabilities for the full infantry squad. The GCV will combine the protection of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP), the mobility of the Bradley, and the operational flexibility of the Stryker. No single vehicle currently provides those attributes. Nor does a single vehicle address the capability gaps associated with MRAP mobility, Bradley internal capacity, and Stryker force protection. The GCV uses lessons learned to provide our soldiers a vehicle with the capabilities they need to accomplish the mission and provide better protection.

HEALTHCARE PROPOSALS

Question. General Dempsey, I believe that the healthcare benefits we provide to our servicemembers and their families are one of the most basic benefits we can provide to the men and women serving our Nation and I also believe it is one of the most effective recruiting and retention tools you have at your disposal. The DOD is proposing several changes to the military health system that could go into effect as early as October of this year. Do you support these cost saving measures?

Answer. Yes. These proposals balance our commitment to preserve the healthcare benefit while slowing future growth in healthcare costs.

Question. Could you please explain what impact they might have on recruiting and retention?

Answer. Healthcare benefits are an important component in motivating applicants to join the Army and remain for a career. Current accession propensity research shows the top reasons that youth would consider joining are extrinsic: pay/money, pay for education, and benefits (health, retirement, etc.). However, we believe that possible increases to TRICARE premiums for retirees would have little to no effect on recruiting and a minimal effect on retention.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

TANKS

Question. General Dempsey, regarding the Abrams tank program, no one on this subcommittee would support continued procurement of tanks for the sake of simply buying more tanks. However, it is our understanding that the Army plan includes the fielding of more than 600 M1A1 Abrams tanks to National Guard forces for the next several decades. These tanks are a generation old and cannot accommodate modern technologies such as communications equipment. Why would we not procure and field the most modern tank available—the M1A2 SEP tank—to all Army heavy forces?

Answer. The Army agrees with the subcommittee's position that we should not buy tanks for the sake of buying tanks. The M1A1 SA remains one of the best tanks in the world, providing overmatch against known threats and digital command interoperability within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team formation. The Army does not plan to immediately replace this very capable and relatively young portion of the Abrams fleet. The Army National Guard (ARNG) began receiving the M1A1 SA tank in August 2008 and will complete fielding in June 2014. The ARNG will also receive a brigade set of M1A2SEPV2 Abrams tanks in June 2011. The Army plans to invest in the Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy which includes modernization of the Abrams fleet to give it the power generation and power distribution needed to allow for the integration of modern technologies.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. General Dempsey, the DOD has spent considerable effort over the last decade developing a comprehensive roadmap for Integrated Air and Missile Defense and improving combat identification and friendly protection capabilities. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have significant joint efforts ongoing to solve these complex theater-dominated issues. If Army Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) efforts transition to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) control, how will the MDA and the Army ensure that the Army multi-purpose weapons and sensors remain tied to the Joint architecture and operating concepts since MDA is not required to participate in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process?

Answer. It is the responsibility of both organizations to ensure Army and the JCIDS operational requirements and Army system requirements are achieved and included in synchronized budget submittals. The Army is working closely with the MDA to ensure that critical issues, such as the one raised here and others along the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Logistics, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities spectrum, are addressed in the transfer discussion. The Army appreciates the complexities of meeting Joint Architectures when MDA is not required to participate in the JCIDS process. Our initial approach is to designate the Program Executive Officer for Missiles and Space (PEO M&S) to simultaneously serve as MDA's program executive for Army BMD Systems to manage the development, integration, testing and production of Army BMD capabilities in conjunction with Army Air and Cruise Missile Defense (ACMD) programs. Additionally, before BMD materiel development responsibility transfers in October 2012, the Army will address how best to align JCIDS requirements with the "Warfighter Involvement Process" (WIP), which results in a "Prioritized Capability List" (PCL), a major factor in determining MDA's resource prioritization. Having a single PEO responsible for BMD and ACMD should ensure an integrated materiel solution. Including the WIP/PCL processes in conjunction with JCIDS should allow the Army to clearly articulate its needs to both communities.

Additionally, the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) will provide further collaborative oversight and guidance to supplement and integrate the work of the WIP/PCL across the Department of Defense (DOD). The Army expects that the current Joint Operational Concepts will be unaffected by transfer of BMD material development responsibilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LISA MURKOWSKI

SUICIDE

Question. The prevention of suicide presents very complex challenges. But I believe it is important that we get the issue out in the open and do all that we can to reduce our suicide rates to zero. I understand that suicide among Active Duty troops declined somewhat in 2010 but suicide rates among members of the Reserve Component spiked.

What, if anything, are we learning in our efforts to prevent suicide among our soldiers?

Answer. While the Army has greatly increased its knowledge about suicidal behavior in our population, we have not found a single factor or issue that is the prevalent risk factor. The Army's Vice Chief of Staff conducts monthly "after action reviews" of recent suicide deaths via a world-wide video teleconference with senior Army leaders. This forum allows the Army senior leaders to learn from other commanders what actions are proving to be most effective at addressing these problems.

The Army released the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention (HP/RR/SP) Report in July 2010. This report was the result of a focused 15-month effort to better understand the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report is intended to inform and educate Army leaders on the importance of recognizing and reducing high-risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death, and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and treatment. It represents the next phase in the Army's ongoing campaign to promote resiliency in a force that has been at war for nearly a decade. Key findings include:

- There are gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high-risk behaviors;
- There has been an erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards;
- The Army has seen an increase in indicators of high-risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts;
- Lapses in surveillance and detection of high-risk behavior;
- There is an increased use of prescription antidepressants, amphetamines and narcotics; and
- Degraded accountability of disciplinary, administrative and reporting processes exacerbate the problem of high-risk behavior.

General Chiarelli sent a message to all the senior leaders in the Army this past month to reinforce leadership responsibilities. In it he told leaders: "When it comes to suicide and other high-risk behavior, we cannot afford to relearn past lessons. Incumbent leaders must train and familiarize new leaders with the principles discussed in chapter three of the Task Force's July 2010 report (The Lost Art Of Leadership In Garrison). The report can be accessed at www.preventsuicide.army.mil in the commander's tool kit. The report emphasizes the need for leaders to respond when soldiers engage in risky behavior—first to protect their health and then to hold them accountable as appropriate. The lessons in leadership presented in this chapter are still relevant today and critically vital to the health of the force."

Finally, the Army has entered into a long term study with the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), the largest behavioral health epidemiological study that the Armed Forces has ever undertaken (The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers or Army STARRS). After 1 year of finalizing the study design, obtaining institutional review board approval, and constructing the necessary capability to gather and analyze data; the Army STARRS team is beginning to conduct the new soldier study and all Army study. To date, just over 10,000 soldiers have been interviewed. No definitive results or conclusions have been obtained to date.

Question. Are you identifying any innovations that offer the promise of further reducing the rates of suicide?

Answer. The Army continues to evaluate and modify programs and services that are related to health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention. We believe that early identification of "high-risk" behavior, such as substance abuse and behavioral problems, will allow leaders to intervene early. The Army has engaged leaders at all levels to improve education and awareness of behavioral health issues and high-risk behaviors. The Army has increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in active, National Guard, and Army Reserve units; required increased behavioral health screening before and after deployments; improved training for chaplains and suicide prevention coordinators; and improved training for primary care medical providers to identify and respond to behavioral health issues. Some of the actions that Army has taken include:

- Released the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Report 2010.
- Produced the interactive "Home Front" training video, which included scenarios for Active, National Guard and Reserve soldiers; Army civilians; and family members.
- Produced the "Shoulder to Shoulder: No Soldier Stands Alone" training video.
- Initiated "face-to-face" postdeployment behavioral health screening (in person or virtual) for all Brigade Combat Teams.

- From December 2009 to November 2010, 218,868 soldiers completed Post-Deployment Health Assessments (PDHA) (141,381 Active Component and 77,487 Reserve Component). The PDHA is used to help identify soldiers who may need a more detailed behavioral health screening by behavioral health providers or specially trained medical personnel.
- Expanded behavioral health providers and services across the Army. During fiscal year 2010, the Army funded 40 unique psychological health programs providing a range of expanded healthcare services to our beneficiaries and obligated over \$168 million additional dollars to behavioral health services.
- Increased the number of Military Family Life Consultants (MFLCs) that work with children and families to provide them support during transitions and separations. Increased from 23 in fiscal year 2007 to over 270 in fiscal year 2010. These MFLCs are embedded in youth service facilities and in on- and off-post schools.
- Implemented standardized screening protocols for soldiers exposed to concussive events to improve early diagnosis and treatment.

Question. Is the Congress providing the Army with adequate funds to meet this challenge?

Answer. Yes, adequate funding for suicide prevention has been provided. The Army budget adequately funds suicide prevention coordinators across the Active Duty force, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. In fiscal year 2012 the Army intends to fund Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASSIST) training/kits, Shoulder to Shoulder and Home Front training videos, Suicide Awareness Guide for Leaders, and training aids/products for the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard soldiers similar to previous years.

The budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes adding 24 behavioral health officers and enlisted technicians to National Guard Brigade Combat Teams and expands the Reserve Component substance abuse program. It also included additional funding for 54 Suicide Prevention Program Managers for the National Guard, 38 Suicide Prevention Program Managers for the Army Reserve, and ASSIST training and kits for the Reserve Component.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

CARBINE WEAPON SYSTEMS

Question. In 2004, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) began a carbine competition. Nine vendors submitted a dozen designs for a new modular, multi-caliber weapons system. SOCOM chose a winner without protest. Over the next 6 years of research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and millions of taxpayer and private dollars spent, SOCOM ultimately approved a new carbine family of weapons for full-rate production in July 2010. This carbine remains a DOD program of record and is currently deployed in combat.

Last July, General Chiarelli, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, stated in the National Defense Magazine that “the Army is wasting money on systems that already exist within the service or in other branches of the military. New weapon requirements often are conceived ‘in a stovepipe.’” He went on to say, “that approach prevents the Army from taking advantage of technology that is already being purchased elsewhere.” In September 2010, Army Colonel Doug Tamillo, the Program Executive Officer (PEO)-soldier and manager responsible for the Army’s new carbine competition, noted the Army will spend over \$30 million of taxpayer money just in testing to make sure we get [the new carbine competition] right.” He went on to describe a dual path strategy and how industry will be able to design a new carbine “that can outperform the M4.”

In December 2010, PEO-soldier, through Picatinny Arsenal, received an unsolicited proposal to obtain the new SOCOM carbine Technical Data Package (TDP). PEO-soldier rejected the proposal. SOCOM’s carbine underwent 6 years of RDT&E, has fired over three million rounds, and is deployed in combat. Adopting SOCOM’s carbine TDP would save the taxpayer over \$30 million associated with the carbine competition, while minimizing acquisition timelines. The Army would therefore be able to have a full and open competition on continued development and manufacturing of an already competed and tested solution.

Why would the Army ignore SOCOM’s 2004 carbine competition that resulted in full-rate production only last July? Doesn’t that represent the waste of money and the “stovepipe” functionality that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army wants to avoid?

Answer. The Army did give consideration to the United States Army Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) 2004 carbine competition. However, the SOCOM re-

quirement, in which the 2004 competition was based, was for a multi-caliber, configurable weapon, which is not the same as the Army requirement. Further, since 2004, competition in the small arms industry has increased and there are many more competitors in the market today. In addition, on October 14, 2008, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110-417 (attached), stated that, "If the small arms capabilities based assessments by the Army identifies gaps in small arms capabilities and the Secretary of the Army determines that a new individual weapon is required to address such gaps, the Secretary shall procure the new individual carbine using full and open competition . . ." The Secretary of the Army, in a memorandum dated October 2, 2008, directed the Army to "take all necessary actions to initiate a best value, Full and Open Competition . . . for a carbine that addresses current and emerging threats."

The Full and Open Competition for a new Individual Carbine (IC) will be conducted in accordance with the Competition in Contracting Act in order to ensure that the soldier receives the best overall weapon at the best value to the Government. The Government is conducting a dual path strategy to deliver the best carbine to the Warfighter and reduce the risk to the taxpayer. This approach is in-line with the Defense Acquisition Executive's (DAE) direction to promote real competition across the Department of Defense. The vendor is open to submit the Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) proposal in the IC competition for best value evaluation.

Question. If you believe that SOCOM and the Army have different weapons requirements, what steps did the Army conduct to evaluate and analyze SOCOM's carbine development before engaging in a similar carbine development effort?

Answer. Project Manager (PM), Soldier Weapons informally participated in SOCOM's carbine evaluation and was kept abreast of the process, test results, and scoring. The PM was not authorized to use SOCOM's criteria and adopt the Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle because the Army was directed to conduct a Full and Open Competition to consider all weapons to equip our soldiers. We are therefore looking beyond SOCOM-specific requirements for this capability.

Question. What analysis of existing alternative capabilities did the Army conduct before beginning the new carbine competition?

Answer. The Army waived the regulatory requirement for an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in December 2010. It was determined that an AoA would not produce additional relevant information in support of the program since the Key Performance Parameters and Key Systems Attributes were baselined on the current M4 Carbine capability as directed by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). Instead the Army will conduct a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) using actual data collected during test and evaluation of the IC candidates and proposals at the conclusion of the competition to determine whether the Army should pursue procurement of the new IC or continue to procure the current M4A1 carbine.

Question. If the Army did not conduct such an analysis, please provide this committee with documentation demonstrating that a waiver was granted.

Answer. The waiver recommendation and Acquisition Decision Memorandum that approve the waiver are attached.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY FOR ACQUISITION AND SYSTEM MANAGEMENT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Subject.—Individual Carbine Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Review

—References:

- Memorandum, ASA (ALT) Policy, Subject: Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Reviews, 02 Dec 09.
- Memorandum, DAMO-CIC, Subject: Approval of the Individual Carbine (IC) Capability Development Document (CDD), 09 Aug 10.
- Memorandum, DAMO-CIA, Subject: Individual Carbine (IC) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Waiver, 31 Aug 10.
- Request the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) conduct an MDD Review to address the Individual Carbine (IC) Capabilities Development.
- The IC CDD, approved on 09 August 2010, establishes the operational requirements to be addressed by the IC materiel solution.
- Preliminary cost estimates indicate the proposal represents a potential ACAT II program.
- I believe an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is not required to support the recommended IC Program. The proposed IC Program will execute a Commercial-off-the-Shelf/Nondevelopmental Items System Competition. Key Performance Parameters and Key System Attributes in the IC CDD were baselined on the

- current M4 Carbine capability as directed by the June 2008 Army Requirements Oversight Counsel (AROC). An AoA would not provide relevant information in support of the MDD.
- This IC CDD addresses the capability gaps identified in the January 2008 Small Arms Capabilities Based Assessment. In June 2008 the AROC directed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to write a carbine requirement based on current capabilities with objective performance enhancements. In October 2008, the Secretary of the Army concurred with the AROC direction and further directed the Army Acquisition Executive to initiate a best value, full and open competition based on the new carbine requirement to provide our Warriors with an enhanced carbine that will maintain their weapons superiority.
 - Request that the Army MDD be scheduled in Oct 2010 so that decisions can be executed in conjunction with the Program Budget Review (PBR) 13–17. Army G–3/5/7 will coordinate with TRADOC, Program Executive Officer-Soldier, and the Army Staff to organize the information required for the MDD briefing.
 - The HQDA G–3/5/7 POC for Soldier Weapon Systems is LTC Karl Petkovich, DAMO–CIC.

MEMORANDUM FOR PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SOLDIER

Subject.—Acquisition Category (ACAT) II Designation for the Individual Carbine Capability (IC) and Designation of Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)

- I have reviewed and approve your request to designate the IC program as ACAT II as outlined in Chapter 3 of Army Regulation 70–1 and I will retain the MDA as the Army Acquisition Executive. You are approved to initiate the IC program at pre-Milestone (MS) B.
- Once I have approved the Acquisition Strategy, I authorize you to expend the appropriate funding to execute the strategy and release the final request for proposals to initiate and conduct the IC competition under Full and Open competition procedures.
- In view of the recent approval of the Capability Development Document and the request from the Army G–3/5/7 to waive the regulatory requirement for an Analysis of Alternatives, I approve that waiver and direct that you return within 60 days with all the required documentation to obtain a positive MS B decision and enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.
- The point of contact is Mr. Shelby Stevens.

Question. If the Army did not conduct an analysis of existing alternatives, and received no waiver, why did you not attempt to thoroughly analyze current DOD programs of record before spending taxpayer dollars?

Answer. As discussed previously, a waiver was granted by the Army Acquisition Executive.

Question. Do you believe that the Army's new carbine competition indicates that the Army was not fully aware of SOCOM's competition? Do you think the Army's lack of proper analysis of existing programs may have contributed to this?

Answer. No, the Army was fully aware of the SOCOM carbine competition. The Army Requirements Oversight Council directed the Training and Doctrine Command to develop a new carbine requirement and to provide our soldiers with the best carbines available in the world. If the Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle is submitted as an IC candidate, it will be evaluated against the IC requirements.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman INOUE. The subcommittee will reconvene on Wednesday, May 25, at 10:30 a.m. to listen and receive testimony from the Missile Defense Agency.

We will now stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., Wednesday, May 11, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, May 25.]