## 2013 Army Reserve Component Submission

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 521 reporting criteria. Unless otherwise indicated, the data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2012. Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from sentent of the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2011		
Major	(73 of 86) 84.9%	93.3 %
Lieutenant Colonel	(6 of 11) 54.5%	86.8 %
FY 2012		
Major	(64 of 81) 79.0%	88.9%
Lieutenant Colonel	(8 of 12) 66.7%	82.7%

\*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration. \*\*Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2011		
Major	(3 of 57) 5.3%	8.7%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 10) 0.0%	3.5%
FY 2012		
Major	(1 of 57) 1.8%	8.0 %

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Lieutenant Colonel	(1 of 10) 10.0%	8.0%

\*Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

\*\*Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 13,653 or 30.7 percent of which 422 were FY 12 accessions.

Army Reserve officers: 10,026 or 32 percent of which 698 were FY 12 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted: 63,567 or 20 percent of which 1,644 were FY 12 accessions.

Army Reserve enlisted: 36,175 or 24 percent of which 6,068 were FY 12 accessions.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 12, there were five Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 12, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA to the Army Reserve.

In FY 12, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted five waivers to the Army Reserve. The waiver provided one Soldier an opportunity to play a professional sport and complete service obligation. Waivers allowed four Soldiers to enter the Health Professionals Scholarship Program. All five Soldiers were appointed Reserve component officers.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 12, there were no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 12, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY 12, there were no graduates released early from an active-duty obligation.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

In FY 12, the ARNG recommended 2,183 commissioned officers for a position-vacancy promotion and the Senior Army Advisor, an active duty officer, concurred with all those promotion actions. The ARNG also recommended 1,234 warrant officers for a position-vacancy promotion, and the Senior Army Advisor likewise concurred with all those promotion actions. Prior to FY 12, warrant officers were not required to go before Federal Recognition Boards for promotion. Therefore, the numbers of warrant officers have not previously been included in the response to this question.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve recommended 62 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 35.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY 12, the ARNG had a total of 14 Soldiers that received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted based on non-completion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) ("medical hold" or "medical hold-Over" units); and non-completion of the Advanced Leader Course or Senior Leader Course due to deployment or training schedule constraints.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve had a total of 7 Soldiers eligible for promotion if recommended that received Warrior Leadership Course (WLC) military education waivers as a result of being deployed or assigned to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) (i.e. medical hold). The USAR saw a reduction in waivers due to the Department of the Army (DA), Army Leader Development Strategy that went into effect 1 Oct 11. This policy discontinued waivers for the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC).

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In FY 12, the ARNG had 83,728 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve had 55,639 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting. The population of 'non-available' reflects 28% of the total USAR end strength: 14% do not meet medical readiness standards (e.g., profile, pending medical review boards, adjudication) and 14% do not meet administrative requirements (e.g., initial entry training; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation; family-care plan, or Lautenberg Amendment restriction). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

A total of 65 ARNG Soldiers, with at least 24 months time in ARNG, were losses in FY 12 due to lack of minimum required military education. The breakdown is 19 enlisted and 46 officers.

In FY12, the USAR discharged 32 officers and 7 enlisted Soldiers for not completing the required initial entry training required for deployment within 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY 12, there were no waivers granted Secretary of the Army to the Army National Guard under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of NGCRRA described in paragraph (9).

In FY 12, The Chief, Army Reserve, granted 210 waivers. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were categorized as Hardship, Medical or Administrative (i.e. Failed Height/Weight Standards, Failed to obtain Driver License, Accepted ROTC Scholarship, Temporary Disqualified, and Failed to Complete High School).

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY 12, 297,515 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,233 (4.8 percent of the Soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 12, 160,864 USAR Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). These PHAs identified 10,879 (6.7%) soldiers for further review due to condition-limiting profiles (temporary or permanent) or failure to meet retention standards. The USAR expects temporary disqualifications to return to duty/deployable status upon resolution of the limiting condition.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY 12, the ARNG transferred all 14,233 Soldiers to a medically non-deployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 12, the Army Reserve identified a total of 7,696 Soldiers through PHAs or other field generated source (medical commands) as having a permanent non-deployable medical condition. These Soldiers are being vetted through a medical evaluation board or a non-duty related physical evaluation board for final determination.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.


Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

USAR Training Strategy IAW the Army Training Strategy executes the progressive training ARFORGEN model (Reset, Train/Ready 1, Train/Ready 2, Train/Ready 3, Available) over a 5 year cycle. The training proficiency achieved at the end of year 3 (Train/Ready) is contingent on Allocated or Apportioned designation.

Effective 1 January 2012, the Secretary of the Army implemented 9-months "Boots on the Ground" (BOG) for the Army. Under this policy USAR units are mobilized for 12 months with 9 months BOG and up to 90 days of post-mobilization training. This allowed the USAR to reduce the training demand on their allocated units while in a pre-mobilization status. For allocated units, the bulk of individual skills training are a pre-mobilization requirement consisting of 24 days of Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Collective training is conducted during 15 days of Annual Training (AT). USAR units will mobilize at no less than a T3 rating and deploy at T2. First Army assumed the training for Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT) on 1 October, 2012.

The USAR generates apportioned units to execute contingency missions, Operational Plans (OPLANS), or other Army requirements during the available year of the ARFORGEN cycle. The USAR is required to provide 26,284 soldiers to the Available Force Pool annually. During a surge requirement the USAR must be able to provide 19,780 (75%) of its total requirement within the first 45 days and 25,881 (98%) within 60 days. The demand for apportioned units within the first 60 days precludes pre-deployment training to achieve deployment readiness after mobilization. The graphic below demonstrates precisely why the Army Reserve must maintain T2 levels of readiness for USAR apportioned formations. The USAR training strategy produces T2 units at the start of the Available Year.



The number of pre-mobilization training days required to train Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) units is based on the complexity of the training to achieve T2. The USAR established three levels of training complexity based on the resources required to achieve readiness objectives.

- Level 1 Most difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days T/R 2&3. Ex: Signal Command, Theater Military Police Command, Combat Support Brigade.
- Level 2 Moderately difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks, unit complexity, 6 additional training days T/R3. Ex: Transportation Battalion, Military Police Battalion.
- Level 3 Least difficult to train based on Decisive Action mission essential tasks and unit complexity; no additional days required. Ex: Airfield Operations Detachments, Medical and Dental Companies

The Army Reserve has internal training support assets to meet collective training and mission command training requirements. The 84th Training Command (Unit Readiness) is the Army Reserve's Executive Agent for planning, coordinating, and conducting Warrior Exercises (WAREX) and Combat Support Training Exercises (CSTX) rotations. The command's training support brigades and battalions provide Observer, Controller/Trainer coverage for WAREXs and CSTXs. The 75th Training Division (Mission Command) advises assists, and trains battalion and higher staffs in Mission Command. They provide exercise leadership and certified Observer, Controller/Trainers. They focus on developing the exercise architecture by replicating operational environments that facilitate Mission Command training; integrate Live/Virtual/Constructive-Gaming (LVC-G) design and simulations capabilities into seamless exercises that facilitate achievement of training objectives. Training is supported by First Army.

Timely alert for mobilizations—at least one year prior—is crucial to the Army National Guard's mission success. Under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, many training tasks previously conducted during the post-mobilization phase now occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for Reserve Component conventional forces. First Army, in theater, conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units waiting to deploy.

Army National Guard training and Army Reserve training complies with the ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multi-year cycles and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and available). Training progresses through these force pools with the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrating to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the Ready year.

All ARNG units are "Combat Units." Forces Command Pre-Deployment Training, in support of Combatant Commands' guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:

- Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB)
- CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel off a COB/FOB for short durations

- CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB
- CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as Brigade Combat Teams).


The pre-mobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A unit's post-mobilization training time depends on the number of the pre-mobilization tasks completed during pre-mobilization. Army goals for post-mobilization training for Reserve Component headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of the unit (note: this time does not include administrative and travel days). Any pre-mobilization tasks not completed during the pre-mobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization station. The ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station with a pre-mobilization task completion rate of 90-95 percent. Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station 100 percent complete.

Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of:

- theater orientation
- rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training
- counterinsurgency operations
- counter-improvised-explosive-device training
- convoy live-fire exercises
- completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period

Post-mobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50-65 training at mobilization station. This training supports a Combat Training Center culminating training event during post-mobilization CAT 4 unit is required to perform in order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center; 30 day training exercises).

Below is an outline depicting post-mobilization training day goals for various units:



The outline below depicts the actual number of post-mobilization training days for various units:\*

	Post Mobilization Training Days			
	Current	Goal	Delta	
I/H/S Brigade Combat Team	63	45	18	
Combat Aviation Brigade	33	60	-27	
Military Police (Internment/Resettlement)	27	40	-3	
Engineer Battalion (Route Clearance)	37	40	-3	
Military Police Company	30	40	-10	
Quartermaster Company	23	15	8	
Engineer Company (Construction)	29	40	-11	
Transportation Company (Heavy Equip Trans)	37	40	-3	

\* from First Army-approved Post-Mobilization Training Plans.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During FY 12, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs. During Army Training Summit III the ARNG-TRS/TRC branches participated in working groups with Department of the Army Management Office Training Support (DAMO-TRS), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Training Support Command (ATSC-STIDD) and other Major Commands to develop an ARFORGEN resourced training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with current Event Matrix Menu and ARFORGEN cycles for all components.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) the ARNG is continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire Trainer- Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the geographical dispersion of units, the ARNG has a larger requirement for simulations that are Armory based. This brought the ARNG to develop and purchase the M-COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers and is fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the M2A2/A3 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS), Mobile Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (M-AGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.

The ARNG-TRS continues to participate in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to address the emerging requirement from the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC) to address the non-stabilized platform gunnery requirements. The ARNG has developed two solutions and updated those devices to meet the non-stabilized Gunnery requirements. The ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT) to train crew drills, convoy operations, command and control and non-stabilized platform gunnery. In addition, the ARNG has added an Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual gunners for .50 caliber, MK19, and M240 machine gun non-stabilized gunnery tasks listed in the forthcoming HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 147 IGT systems have been fielded to ARNG units with 80 more of the Brigade Combat Team solution.

The ARNG has bought down its requirement for 11 of the Non-Rated Crew Member Trainer for aviation crews using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding. This is an Army Program of Record (PoR) trainer that simulates training the aviation crew skills prior to live events.

The ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both the unit and institutional levels. This is a recognized "In Lieu Of" training device.

The ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements. In FY 12 they have bought down their requirements using NGREA funding. This system is a PoR marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) and phasing out systems that have concurrency issues. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit

collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. The ARMY is currently re-competing this contract and the ARNG has a representative that is on the source selection committee to address the ARNG dispersion challenges and additional training requirements.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or non-pyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature effects. The ARNG has fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of which, 194 are non-pyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG training sites across 39 states and territories. They have received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life cycle sustainment as of 3rd Quarter FY12. ARNG-TRS is continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based on the recently completed Army Training Summit III. The latest IEDES innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to support less than company size training scenarios that has started in 3d Quarter FY12. The ARNG has restructured the Training Support section of the G-3 to address this issue and assigned an officer to manage the program of asymmetric warfare.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp Dodge, IA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and Fort Leavenworth, KS, with two additional sites for the future at Camp Gowen field/Orchard Range and Fort Chaffee. The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre-mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool defined as certified company proficiency with demonstrated battalion battle staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

The ARNG is also looking to procure their requirement of the Dismounted Soldier Training Suite to compliment the Close Combat Tactical Trainer.

The ARNG way-ahead is continuing to use PoR and seven recognized "In Lieu of" devices to train and sustain vital and perishable skill sets and interact with all components to support the live, virtual, constructive and gaming training strategy. The ARNG-TRS is drafting a white paper that will address a well-informed TADSS strategy that is ARFORGEN or Future Forces Generation (FUFORGEN) driven. TADSS are a key function of the ARNG training at home station and are heavily relied upon by commanders at all levels. In times of fiscal uncertainty the use of simulations becomes greater and critical to the readiness of the ARNG.

The USAR executes a training strategy committed to producing trained units and battle staffs for 21st Century operations that are prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commanders and other Army requirements. This requires realistic and comprehensive home station training supported by sufficient number of training man-days, and an appropriate mix of Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming platforms.

The USAR focused on maximizing simulation technology and home station training opportunities in support of commander's Force Generation training readiness objectives. Home station training capabilities must provide a training framework (operational, institutional, and self development) that approximates the conditions of the operational environment while mitigating resource constraints of land, manpower, facilities, and training dollars. The Army Reserve requires blended, integrated, and distributive training capabilities (software, equipment, network capacity, and facilities) to train and educate more efficiently and effectively in support of ARFORGEN, the Army's Training Concept, the Army Learning Concept, and the Army Leader Development Strategy.

The USAR is currently conducting a pilot program which adds ten laptops to ten different USARC locations. These computers are being fielded for Distance Learning (DL) to support commanders in the field and allow Soldiers to meet mandatory DA Electronic Based Distributed Learning (EBDL), Distance Learning (DL), and other training requirements.

The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army Reserve's major collective training exercises conducted on Army Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and constructive environments to train senior battle staffs and to conduct company and platoon level lanes training. The Army Reserve has made sizable investments in improving facilities and infrastructure in order to leverage technologies to enhance training, reduce costs, and facilitate collaboration. The TADSS and Virtual Battle Space 2 (VGS2) systems have increased the readiness of units trained on them. Additionally, the 75th Mission Command Training Division has integrated a high-tech joint constructive battle staff training simulation to provide more realistic training to rotating soldiers. The next step for the USAR is to link Virtual, Constructive, and Live environments.

The USAR has fifty (50) Digital Training Facilities (DTFs), located in twenty-eight (28) states. Daily, our Soldiers conduct DL training on any of the 562 course, Structured Self Development, and individual or squad and platoon level collective training within these facilities. The Army Reserve is currently focused on using the VBS2 and distributed capability within these facilities as Spokes to the Reserve's five (5) Mission Command Training Centers (MCTCs) to conduct worldwide virtual and or constructive training.

The USAR has identified the Deployed Digital Training Campus (DDTC) as an effective portable capability to provide Gaming and Structured Self Development training to its units. In FY 12, the Army Reserve conducted an analysis to identify training gaps within the Pacific areas of American Samoa, Saipan and Guam. The Army Reserves will conduct a Proof of Principle (PoP) using the DDTC in American Samoa to enhance and improve the Soldiers' proficiency in Structured Self Development and individual, squad and platoon level proficiency. Additionally, VBS2 will be incorporated in Samoa, Guam and Saipan to supplement the current training and enhance training proficiency.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The states do not capture this data. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY 12, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 1,887 inspections of the Army National Guard. Regular Army Officers assigned to the

respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the bulk of these inspections (1,833). Of the remaining, First Army and the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted 26 inspections, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and various external inspection agencies conducted 28. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two special assessments within the last 12 months. The first assessment was entitled "Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve" and was directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 11 August 2011. This assessment (Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve) was conducted 17 October 2011 through 26 January 2012. A total of 38 units were assessed as part of this assessment. The final report was approved in April 2012. The second assessment entitled "Special Assessment of the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) within the US Army Reserve" was also directed by the Chief, Army Reserve on 22 August 2012. This assessment began in October 2012 and is concurrently ongoing; the expected completion date is February 2013. To date, a total 30 of the 50 units selected for this assessment have been assessed by members of the Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General. The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General has also conducted 7 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections within the past 12 months. The overall goal of both assessments as well as the IO inspections was not to evaluate a unit's deployability status. However, out of the total 74 units assessed/inspected, nothing was found that would cause a unit to be listed as non-deployable. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

The Army continues to meet Congressional intent as it pertains to Active Component (AC) support to Reserve Component (RC) readiness outlined in Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended. Every RC unit that deployed during Fiscal Year 2012 was properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment overseas and in the Continental United States (CONUS) by processes associated with Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).

The legislated roles and responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of multiple associated AC division and above units continue to be executed by the commanders of First Army (FORSCOM's executive agent for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and

mobilization of conventional RC units in the Continental United States); the 196<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) (for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the European Command's area of responsibility).

ARFORGEN continues to be the Army's core process to synchronize the progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR and other Army requirements. Within ARFORGEN, all active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units cycle through the ARFORGEN force pools and are designated either for deployment to a validated CCDR operational requirement or for the execution of a contingency mission, operational plan, or other validated Army requirement.

Assessments of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992) are executed and maintained by First Army, the 196<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC units progress through the ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.

On September 4, 2012, the Secretary of the Army signed Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy). This policy establishes a framework for the integration of the Army's Active and Reserve Components as a "Total Force" and includes general guidance on the integration of AC and RC forces for training, readiness, and employment. Implementation guidance is expected to be published in FY 2013.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY 12) Authorizations				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	41	18	0	59
TRADOC	51	12	0	63
FORSCOM	1033	2165	101	3299
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1155	2244	102	3501

Title XI (FY 12) Assigned				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	43	30	0	71

TRADOC	26	13	0	39
FORSCOM	869	2108	87	3064
USARPAC	25	46	1	72
TOTAL	963	2190	88	3241

As of February 5, 2013, the Army had 3,241 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by state – the chart above provides the best representation of how Title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.